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5TIMELINE
1961  Sierra Leone attains independence.
1991  Sierra Leonean civil war begins, with RUF (led by Foday Sankoh) capturing   
  towns on Liberian border. 
1992   Valentine Strasser deposes President Joseph Momoh in military coup.
1996  Strasser deposed by his defence minister, Julius Maada Bio, in military    
  coup.
1996  Ahmad Tejan Kabbah elected president in February, signs peace accord    
  with Sankoh in November.
1997  Peace deal fails. Kabbah deposed by army in May. Johnny Paul Koroma    
  leads the AFRC military junta. Koroma suspends the constitution,     
  bans demonstrations and abolishes political parties.
1997  UNSC Resolution 1132 imposes arms and oil embargo on Sierra Leone. A   
  British company, Sandline, continues to supply ‘logistical support’, including   
  weapons, to Kabbah allies.
1998  Nigerian-led West African intervention force ECOMOG takes Freetown back   
  from rebel forces in February. In March, Kabbah returns to Freetown. 
1999 	 RUF	seizes	parts	of	Freetown	from	ECOMOG	in	January.	Severe	fighting		 	
	 	 follows	until	a	ceasefire	is	negotiated	in	May.	The	Lomé	Peace	Accord	is		 	 	
  signed in July, and includes an amnesty provision for Sankoh and all rebel   
  combatants and a clause requiring the Sierra Leonean government to 
  establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In October, the UNSC    
  establishes the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).
2000  UNAMSIL personnel are attacked and several hundred abducted. They are   
  eventually rescued by British paratroopers. Sankoh is captured. Kabbah    
  writes to UN Secretary General (UNSG) to request that international 
  community prosecute war crimes committed during civil war. UNSC 
  Resolution 1315 requests UNSG to negotiate with Sierra Leonean 
  government to establish a war crimes court.
2001  Fighting slows. UN troops deploy in rebel-held territory, followed by the    
  British-trained Sierra Leonean army. A programme of disarmament begins. 
2002  Civil war declared over in January. Government and UN sign agreement to   
  set up SCSL and court staff begin work. Truth and Reconciliation 
  Commission is established. Kabbah wins decisive election victory.
62003  Thirteen indictments issued by SCSL Prosecutor, including indictments for   
  alleged RUF, AFRC and CDF leaders, along with Charles Taylor, former    
  President of Liberia. Sankoh dies of natural causes while awaiting trial. 
2004  SCSL opens in March and trials begin in June. Truth and Reconciliation    
	 	 Commission	publishes	final	report.
2005  UNAMSIL completes its mandate and is succeeded by the UN Integrated    
	 	 Office	for	Sierra	Leone	(UNIOSIL)
2006  Charles Taylor arrested in Nigeria and transferred to SCSL custody. The    
  majority of Sierra Leonean international debt is written off. 
2007  Charles Taylor’s trial begins, having been relocated to The Hague. SCSL    
	 	 Trial	Chamber	in	Freetown	delivers	first	(guilty)	verdicts	in	AFRC	case,	
  followed by more guilty verdicts in CDF case. Ernest Bai Koroma wins 
  Presidential Election. 
2008  NGO Fambul Tok (meaning Family Talk) is launched in Sierra Leone in 
  response to the lack of provision in the Truth and Reconciliation 
  Commission for community reconciliation led by local people. 
2009  SCSL Trial Chamber delivers guilty verdicts in RUF case. 
2010  UNSC lifts last remaining sanctions against Sierra Leone.
2012  SCSL Trial Chamber delivers guilty verdict in Taylor trial. National 
  elections take place and return Koroma and All People’s Congress to    
  power. 
Freetown
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7INTRODUCTION
Lessons from Sierra Leone
Kirsten Ainley
The following is a report of the proceedings of a major conference on the Sierra 
Leonean	post-conflict	transition.	The	conference	took	place	in	London	in	December	
2012, with expert speakers making on-the-record presentations and off-the-
record comments in discussion sessions. This report is designed to summarise 
the main arguments made in each presentation and to capture the key points 
made in discussion. The conference was organised by Rebekka Friedman, Chris 
Mahony and me, attended by more than 80 policy-makers, NGO staff, lawyers and 
academics, and generously funded by the Department of International Relations 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and by the LSE 
Justice and Security Programme. 
There were a number of reasons to organise a conference on the Sierra Leonean 
transition in 2012, not least of which is that on 17th November 2012 the third general 
election since the end of the civil war was held, returning President Koroma and 
the All People’s Congress to power. Many commentators viewed the election as a 
test of the country’s recovery and were keen to see if the election would take place 
without civil unrest or violence. It did. There were incidents of violence reported, but 
for	the	most	part	the	election	seemed	to	confirm	the	stability	of	the	country.	So	Sierra	
Leone can now be treated, at least in terms of its top-line democratic practices, as a 
successful	case	of	post-conflict	transition.	Whether	or	not	it	is	too	soon	to	make	this	
judgment was an issue that arose during the course of the conference. 
There are three further reasons to continue to study the Sierra Leonean transition: 
1) To understand what it can tell us about the causes of     
peace and the causes of war;
2) To identify the relative importance of international and     
domestic factors;
3)	 To	attempt	to	develop	findings	which	can	be	generalised		 	
to other contexts. 
Studying	which,	if	any,	post-conflict	mechanisms	and	policies	have	been	successful	
in stabilising the peace should reveal something about the causes of war. If the 
Special Court can be seen as a success, this may lead to the conclusion that 
the nine individuals found guilty by the Court were largely responsible for the 
devastation of the 1991-2002 period. If this is the case, then international criminal 
law, as practiced through the now permanent institution of the International Criminal 
Court, may be critical in deterring ‘evil’ individuals from making war in future. 
However,	if	the	causes	of	the	conflict	were	more	structural	–	to	do	with	the	levels	
of corruption, unemployment and ‘systemic failure’ of government described by 
the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission – then rather different 
approaches	to	prevention	and	conflict	transformation	may	be	necessary,	including	
implementing far more fully the recommendations of the TRC.
One of the most critical reasons to keep studying Sierra Leone is to understand 
the international character of both the war and the peace, which should prompt 
some consideration of the ways in which international actors should or could be 
held	responsible	for	their	contributions	to	conflict	as	well	as	an	identification	of	how	
they	can	assist	in	post-conflict	transition.	There	are	numerous	international	bodies	
whose	 responsibility	 was	 not	 (or	 was	 only	 barely)	 considered	 by	 post-conflict	
mechanisms, despite the fact that Sierra Leone’s history is rich (or, perhaps more 
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8accurately, poor) in international connections. This 
was a colony founded on the international trade of 
people – between 1668 and 1807, more than 50,000 
slaves were shipped to the Americas by British 
slave Traders via Bunce Island near Freetown, and 
Freetown itself was founded as a home for freed 
slaves and London’s ‘black poor’ in 1787. Sierra 
Leone was a British colony up until 1961 and the 
TRC noted, in determining the causes of the civil 
war, the effects of British rule in establishing a 
two-tier system that privileged those who lived in 
prosperous Freetown versus those who lived in the 
rest of the country.
 
Remains of Slave Tunnels in Freetown
Belgium District
Photograph | Simone Datzberger
Post	 1961,	 international	 influence	 remained	 and	
by 1991 its importance is hard to overstate. The 
highest	 profile	 prosecution	 at	 the	 Special	 Court	
for Sierra Leone was not of a Sierra Leonean but 
a Liberian. And Charles Taylor was far from alone 
in his interest in the country. The Sierra Leonean 
government bought in the services of foreign 
fighters	 in	 the	 form	 of	 one	 of	 the	 first	 Private	
Military Companies – Executive Outcomes – in 
the	 early	 1990s,	 and	 later,	 in	 defiance	 of	 UNSC	
Resolution 1132 (which outlawed the supply of 
arms)	 the	British	 firm	Sandline	 supplied	weapons	
to Kabbah’s allies. A Nigerian-led West African 
intervention force (ECOMOG), a UN peacekeeping 
force (UNAMSIL) and a British contingent of around 
1000 paratroopers also played important roles in 
the	conflict.	UN	peacekeepers	departed	only	seven	
years	ago,	and	 the	UN	Integrated	Office	 in	Sierra	
Leone remains active in the country.
Post-war,	 large	 numbers	 of	 foreign	 court	 officials,	
NGO staff and researchers could be found in 
Freetown,	 along	 with	 representatives	 from	 firms	
and governments  around the globe looking to take 
part in exploiting Sierra Leone’s rich collection of 
natural resources – including recently discovered 
offshore oil deposits. With one of the lowest GDPs 
per capita and one of the highest levels of debt in 
the world, the country is also heavily dependent on 
foreign aid. 
However, Sierra Leone is not simply intervened in – 
it	is	now	also	an	intervener,	contributing	significantly	
to United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
including the UN Mission to Darfur (UNAMID), 
and, from early 2013, it will deploy a U.S.-trained 
battalion to the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM). 
It should therefore be clear (and it was to the TRC, 
and to some extent to the SCSL) that domestic 
actors are far from alone in their responsibility 
for	 both	 conflict	 and	 the	 post-conflict	 transition.	
However, international actors aside from Taylor 
have	 not	 been	 held	 to	 account	 in	 any	 significant	
way, and may in fact have been privileged in the 
transitional justice process. Presenters through 
the day noted that the SCSL was aimed at an 
international audience keen to see justice done 
more than a domestic audience keen to achieve 
peace, stability and some level of economic growth. 
Chris	Mahony’s	presentation	showed	the	influence	
of the UK and US in the justice process, though 
Prosecutor Hollis noted the broad support for the 
SCSL from Sierra Leoneans, as evidenced by the 
recent No Peace Without Justice survey.1 
Finally,	the	international	context	of	the	conflict	and	
post-conflict	in	Sierra	Leone	should	remind	scholars	
of the importance of comparative research. Various 
of the conference presentations considered the 
extent to which the Sierra Leonean experience is 
unique, and how much is shared between other 
types	 of	African	 conflict	 or	 conflict	 more	 broadly.	
Practitioners	and	scholars	who	work	on	post-conflict	
transitions often differ both within their own group 
and with each other on the extent to which they see 
their particular country of focus as being unique. 
Internationals can be accused of imposing a one-
size-fits-all	model	without	taking	account	of	context,	
but it may be that there are features of the Sierra 
Leonean case that indicate shared characteristics 
with	 other	 conflicts.	 Conference	 presentations	 on	
the Truth Commission did suggest generalizable 
findings,	 as	 did	 discussion	 on	 the	 merits	 and	
dangers of prosecuting members of civil defence 
forces.
1 Available at: http://www.npwj.org/content/Making-Justice-Count-
Assessing-impact-and-legacy-Special-Court-Sierra-Leone-Sierra-Leone-and
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However, for all the lessons that may be learned by 
studying Sierra Leone, it is not clear that anyone 
other than historians in the country itself still cares 
very	 much	 about	 aspects	 of	 the	 post-conflict	
transition that scholars from abroad spend time 
researching. The war ended a decade ago and 
post-war institutions such as the SCSL and TRC 
are part of the past in Sierra Leone now, not the 
present. In his 23rd November 2012 swearing-
in speech, President Koroma set out his priorities 
as creating jobs, training young people to seize 
opportunities in the mining, construction and 
agricultural sectors, continuing with infrastructural 
development programmes to bring roads, electricity 
and	healthcare	to	all,	attracting	investment,	fighting	
corruption and protecting rights.2   He acknowledged 
the	post-conflict	environment	of	Sierra	Leone	briefly	
when he committed to sustaining the country’s 
‘peace, democracy and development’, but justice 
did not feature in his speech at all. The Roundtable 
at the end of the conference took up this issue 
when	 reflecting	 on	 whether	 the	 impact	 of	 justice	
institutions can be measured when it appears they 
are no longer relevant to the domestic audience who 
it is hoped will gain from them. This is not to suggest 
that the institutions have no impact – it may be that 
transitional	 justice	 mechanisms	 and	 post-conflict	
reconstruction and reintegration programmes 
are in large part responsible for enabling Sierra 
Leone to transition to what the US now describes 
as ‘one of the most stable countries in a volatile 
region’.3  They may be responsible for successfully 
ending the civil war and preventing another from 
starting,	 or	 for	 setting	 human	 rights	 firmly	 on	 the	
2  Speech text available at: http://allafrica.com/sto-
ries/201211240237.html?viewall=1
3 US Department of State Fact Sheet on US Relations 
with Sierra Leone, July 23rd 2012, available at http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm
agenda of the President. The conference speakers 
were divided on the issue of whether any of the 
transitional justice mechanisms employed could be 
credited with such success, with some speakers 
seeing justice as a necessary prelude to the peace 
and prosperity many Sierra Leoneans prioritise, 
and some seeing these mechanisms as powerless 
in the face of the structural conditions that enabled 
civil war, and could again. 
The conference presenters and audience 
considered these issues, and others, during the 
course of the day and generated a rich discussion. 
Where possible in the report that follows, we have 
identified	 both	 core	 issues	 and	 questions	 that	
remain to be answered, to promote further work 
on Sierra Leone. To access the papers presented 
at the conference, please contact the presenters 
directly using the email addresses given at the end 
of the report. Finally, thanks are owed to Simone 
Datzberger for acting as rapporteur and drafting 
a comprehensive conference report, to Geraldine 
Burnett for undertaking the reprographics editing on 
the report and to Simon Charters, Special Assistant 
to Prosecutor Hollis, for facilitating the Prosecutor’s 
attendance at the conference. 
.
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PART I  
Taking Stock of 
Transitional Justice 
in Sierra Leone
KEYNOTE SPEECH
Brenda J.Hollis, Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
‘People begin wars, 
people commit crimes, 
and people prevent or end wars’.
In	her	opening	 speech,	Prosecutor	Hollis	 reflected	upon	 the	events	behind	 the	establishment	
of the SCSL, and assessed the Court’s work and the legacy it may leave. She argued that 
Sierra Leone has shown great strength in its commitment to justice and has moved forward very 
successfully towards a peaceful future. There are many views on the Transitional Justice (TJ) 
scheme of Sierra Leone, which are widely discussed among practitioners of International Criminal 
Law (ICL), academics, representatives of states, civil society advocates, citizens of West Africa, 
and, of course, among the people of Sierra Leone themselves. In the Prosecutor’s view, the latter 
group should be the judge of the work of the SCSL and the legacy the Court will leave for their 
country.	With	these	opening	remarks	in	mind,	she	discussed	five	questions	relevant	to	evaluating	
the work of the SCSL. 
How	does	the	SCSL	fit	into	the	transitional	justice	scheme?	
Countries	and	societies	emerging	from	conflict,	genocide	and	crimes	against	humanity	have	many	
needs. They range from economic revitalisation to infrastructure development and bolstering 
good governance, to name but a few. For the Prosecutor, accountability is a fundamental need: 
war-torn societies need accountability and some form of justice for crimes that were committed 
during	conflict.	If	this	need	is	not	met,	it	does	not	simply	fade	away.		On	the	contrary,	she	argued,	
the	need	might	show	 itself	 in	 future	conflicts	or	 in	an	 inability	of	 the	society	 to	move	 forward.	
There are a number of options that can be used, either individually or collectively, to address the 
need for accountability and justice, such as investigations and trials at the national level, truth 
and reconciliation commissions (TRC), traditional justice systems, or hybrid, internationalised or 
international criminal courts. 
PA
R
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CORE ISSUES 
-	How	does	the	SCSL	fit	into	the	transitional	justice	scheme?	
- What successes, if any, has the Court had? 
- Has the SCSL been fair? 
- How well has the SCSL done its work?
- What legacy, if any, will the SCSL leave – at the local, regional and international 
  level? 
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The Prosecutor argued that national judicial systems are 
the optimal solution for determining accountability for the 
great majority of perpetrators of war crimes. However, 
national justice systems are not always available to 
meet the needs of accountability and justice. This was 
particularly the case for Sierra Leone, as the country 
was unable to address war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in its national judicial system after eleven years 
of	civil	war.	This	was	because	the	Lomé	Peace	Agreement	
of July 1999 included a provision granting amnesty at 
the national level to all combatants and collaborators 
in	 the	conflict.	The	SCSL	was	 therefore	created	 to	offer	
a criminal justice response to the massive violation of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) committed by the 
people who bore the greatest responsibility for those 
crimes. According to the Prosecutor, it is in this context and within this framework that one should assess the 
work and the legacy of the SCSL. 
In a recent survey conducted in Sierra Leone by No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ), participants were asked 
the question: ‘What means must be used to have justice?’1  Over 71% of those Sierra Leoneans who were 
polled favoured the national court system, but more than half were also in favour of the SCSL. 48% thought 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) an appropriate mechanism to achieve justice and 27% supported a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
The SCSL, but also the tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, have been criticised for at best having 
dealt with a very small number of perpetrators. Explanations can be found in their lack of resources and time, 
but also in the inability of such courts to process many thousands of perpetrators. Consequently, international 
courts have to carefully gauge how many cases they can investigate and prosecute in their effort to assist the 
country in its transition to a peaceful future, and leave other perpetrators to be dealt with by national systems, 
traditional methods or TRCs. Despite criticisms on the selective nature of prosecutions, the Prosecutor argued 
that the NPWJ survey showed that the SCSL had played a valuable role in the Sierra Leonean transitional 
justice process.
What successes if any, has the Court had? What has been the work of the SCSL since its existence? 
The	Prosecutor	briefly	re-stated	the	dynamics	that	led	to	the	Special	Court’s	establishment	and	mandate	that	
it was given. After UN peacekeepers were taken hostage by (mainly) RUF soldiers in May 2000, the then 
President of Sierra Leone wrote to the UN Secretary General requesting UN assistance in the establishment 
of a court to try Foday Sankoh and the senior leaders of the RUF for crimes against the people of Sierra Leone. 
In August 2000, the Security Council requested the Secretary General to negotiate with Sierra Leone to 
establish an independent court.  In January 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and the UN 
signed an agreement and the SCSL became, at the time, the only international tribunal situated in the country 
where the crimes under its jurisdiction took place. The mandate of the Court was simple and straightforward, 
namely: ‘To prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November, 
1996’.2		The	Prosecutor	clarified	that	the	mandate	of	the	Court	was	not	to	prosecute	those	who	began	the	war,	
or who fought the war in Sierra Leone, but those who in the course of the war committed war crimes, crimes 
against	humanity	and	serious	violations	of	IHL.	In	March	of	2002,	the	legislature	of	Sierra	Leone	ratified	this	
agreement and the Court came into existence and began to do its work. 
1	 NPWJ	is	an	international	non-profit	organisation	founded	in	1993.	In	the	summer	of	2012	NPWJ	conducted	a	survey	assess-
ing	the	impact	of	the	SCSL	on	Sierra	Leone	and	Liberia.	The	survey	was	administered	to	2,841	people	and	the	findings	published	in	a	
final	report	entitled:	Making	Justice	Count,	which	can	be	accessed	at:	http://www.npwj.org/content/Making-Justice-Count-Assessing-
impact-and-legacy-Special-Court-Sierra-Leone-Sierra-Leone-and
2 30 November 1996 was the date of an earlier peace agreement signed in Abidjan.
Special Court for Sierra Leone
Photograph |  SCSL website 
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In the summer of 2002, only a few months after the Court 
was	created,	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor	(OTP)	commenced	
operations	 in	 Sierra	 Leone.	 The	 first	 task	 was	 to	 conduct	
investigations, and to gather and categorize the evidence. 
Prosecutor Hollis participated in some of these early 
investigations, and described the method of investigation 
and evidence collection that was used. Rape, sexual slavery 
or mutilation can be either a domestic crime, or they can be 
elevated to crimes against humanity or war crimes if certain 
criteria can be met. If there was not enough evidence to 
elevate such a crime to a crime against humanity or a war 
crime, the SCSL would not have had jurisdiction over it.  In 
order to determine whom the SCSL could effectively charge, 
there was a set of checks, which prosecutors had to meet for 
each form of liability. It differs whether someone physically 
committed, or ordered a crime, or planned a crime, or aided 
a crime. And while looking at potential suspects, the Court 
had to operate within its mandate. This required the Prosecutor at the time to interpret the language of the 
Special Court Statute, and also to limit the number of potential indictments. There were many discussions 
within the OTP on how to interpret the language of the Statute and consequently how to determine who did 
‘bear the greatest responsibility’. Should it include lower level commanders who were responsible for the most 
horrific	and	notorious	crimes	impacting	a	significant	number	of	victims?	Or	should	it	rather	be	interpreted	only	
as applying to the highest leaders and commanders that are linked to the direct perpetrators of these crimes? 
Ultimately, it was the Prosecutor who determined how the OTP would interpret the language of the Statute. 
This process led the OTP to indict 13 individuals. These were leaders of the various factions within the country, 
and Charles Taylor. The Court initially indicted eight individuals, and in March 2003, these eight indictments 
were taken to London where the judges of the SCSL were holding a plenary session to review the Rules of 
Procedure	and	Evidence	and	to	determine	if	they	should	make	any	changes.	The	first	eight	indictments	were	
approved. With the exception of the indictment against Charles Taylor, all other indictments were made public. 
Charles Taylor’s indictment was not unsealed until June 2003, when the OTP believed they had an opportunity 
to obtain custody of Taylor because he had left Liberia for Ghana and there was hope that Ghana would turn 
him over. The Court did not, in the event,  gain custody of Taylor until 2006. 
The OTP also charged the leaders of the CDF (Civil Defence Forces), which is still a topic of debate inside 
and	 outside	 Sierra	 Leone.	 The	CDF	were	 fighting	 to	 reinstate	 the	 democratically	 elected	Government	 of	
Sierra Leone. However, in attempting to achieve that goal, they committed crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.	Hence,	 the	SCSL	 indicted	 three	senior	CDF	fighters:	Samuel	Hinga	Norman,	Moinina	Fofana	and	
Allieu Kondewa. 
Of the men who were taken into custody, one died before the trial began (Foday Sankoh), one died before his 
trial was completed (Samuel Hinga Norman), and nine were tried and have been convicted — the sentences 
in those cases range from 15 years to 52 years. Charles Taylor was convicted on all eleven counts and was 
sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment in May 2012. 
The	first	 trials	began	 in	2004	and	 the	cases	 involving	 the	 leaders	of	 the	 three	major	armed	groups	 (RUF,	
AFRC and CDF) were completed through appeals. The last appeal in those cases was concluded in October 
2009. The Taylor case is currently on appeal and the Appeals Chamber judgment is expected at the end of 
September 2013. With that judgment, the judicial mandate of the Court will be completed. The SCSL will 
cease to exist and a Residual Special Court will take over. That Residual Special Court will be responsible for 
a number of issues, among them:
- The archives of the Special Court
Prosecutor Brenda J. Hollis
Photograph | Special Court for Sierra Leone 
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- The enforcement of sentences of those who have been convicted
- Any requests from those prisoners (e.g. review of their conviction)
- The continued protection of witnesses who came forward to testify
Further, the Residual Special Court will have the same power as the SCSL to charge and try for contempt any 
individual who attempts to interfere with witnesses who have appeared before the SCSL. 
Has the SCSL been fair? 
For	 the	 Prosecutor,	 the	 question	 of	 fairness	 has	many	 dimensions	 and	 she	 therefore	 reflected	 upon	 the	
following sub-questions:
1) Has the SCSL been fair to those who have been accused of a crime? Subsequently, has it complied 
with the fundamental rights of each and every accused who appeared before the Court? Have they been given 
a fair hearing? 
2) Has the Court been fair to witnesses including victims who have appeared before the SCSL? Has the 
Court taken action to protect those whose security is at risk, whether they were witnesses for the 
prosecution or the defence? Has the Court ensured that the witnesses, victims and sources are treated with 
respect and dignity? 
Many criticize the Court as not being fair because of its limited number of indictments. Some of these criticisms 
include that the SCSL indicted CDF leader Norman but not former President Kabbah. Many ask why the SCSL 
indicted	Charles	Taylor	in	Liberia	–	and	why	not	also	Gaddafi	in	Libya?	Likewise,	why	did	the	SCSL	not	indict	
Blaise	Campaoré	in	Burkina	Faso?	In	the	Prosecutor’s	view	these	are	fair	questions,	but	her	answer,	based	
on her experiences in the Court, is that the evidence did not support these indictments. Being a head of state 
alone does not necessarily make someone responsible for crimes. In short, the evidence the SCSL gathered 
was	not	sufficient	to	lead	to	the	indictment	of	these	individuals.	
Likewise, there have also been heated discussions about the non-prosecution of mid-level offenders who 
were	guilty	of	many	horrific	crimes.	This	may	be	viewed	as	another	measurement	of	fairness,	particularly	for	
those victims who were directly affected by the conduct of these mid-level offenders. In her own practice, the 
Prosecutor stated that she does not go any further than where the evidence takes her. Hence, her assessment 
as	an	independent	consultant	(when	contracted	to	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor	in	2002-03),	and	as	a	member	
of	the	Court	was	that,	once	again,	they	had	insufficient	evidence	for	indictments	against	these	individuals.	
With regards to the rights of the accused and the rights of the witnesses, it is the judges who must ensure 
that fairness prevails. They have to be impartial, independent and fair in their assessment of the evidence, 
in the treatment of the accused and in the treatment of the witnesses. Looking at the judges of the SCSL 
one can truly observe an international mix. Judges from the Trial Chamber are of Sierra Leonean, Canadian, 
Cameroonian, Samoan, Irish and Ugandan nationality. The Appeals Chamber consists of two judges from 
Sierra Leone, one from Nigeria, one from Austria, and one judge from the United States. Two former judges in 
the Appeals Chamber were of British and Sri Lankan nationality. 
How well has the SCSL done its work? 
The Prosecutor again referred to two surveys that have been conducted in order to evaluate the work of the 
SCSL.	The	Sierra	Leonean	NGO	Campaign	for	Good	Governance	(CGG)	carried	out	the	first	one	in	2003,	
interviewing 1,200 people. One of their questions asked was whether the SCSL is necessary. About 62% of 
respondents said yes. In 2012, the survey conducted by the NPWJ sought to evaluate the Court’s legacy in 
Sierra Leone. The NPWJ survey interviewed more than 2,800 people across all 12 districts in Sierra Leone and 
five	counties	in	Liberia.	In	total,	1,500	respondents	were	Sierra	Leonean.3  When asked: ‘What was the Special 
Court established to achieve?’ 55% of Sierra Leoneans said it was established to prosecute perpetrators of 
3 NPWJ ensured that they were targeting groups that are often left out, such as women, young people and persons with various 
disabilities. The Prosecutor emphasised that the reports methodology has yet to be rigorously and independently reviewed, though does 
see the results as a strong indication of how some primary stakeholders view the Court.
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crimes committed during the war, 29% said it was established to bring justice, and 23% said it was established 
to	bring	peace.	Around	77%	of	Sierra	Leonean	respondents	affirmed	that	the	SCSL	had	accomplished	what	it	
had set out to achieve. In addition, 88% of Sierra Leonean respondents stated that the SCSL had done a good 
job. Further, people interviewed were also asked whether the SCSL could be trusted to bring justice, and 86% 
of Sierra Leonean respondents said yes. 85% of Sierra Leonean respondents indicated that they believe that 
those who bore the greatest responsibility were brought to trial by the SCSL. The Prosecutor noted that over 
time	this	work	will	be	the	subject	of	more	reflection,	questioning	and	debate.	
What legacy, if any, will the SCSL leave – at local, regional and international level?
Ultimately, it is for the people of Sierra Leone and the broader international community (IC) to give feedback 
on and evaluate how well the SCSL performed its work. The principal legacy and success of the SCSL will be 
that it delivered its mandate, namely to prosecute those who bore the greatest responsibility for the crimes 
committed	during	the	conflict	in	Sierra	Leone.	The	SCSL	is	a	criminal	court:	‘it	is	nothing	more	and	it	is	nothing	
less’. The Court cannot cure the economic woes of Sierra Leone and address many of the needs of victims 
who suffer to this day. In her travels throughout the country, the Prosecutor discovered that there are areas 
that have still been untouched in terms of, for instance, putting roofs on houses that were burnt before the 
war ended. There is also a pressing need to help war widows, orphans and amputees in their daily survival. 
No doubt, much work has to be done but it is beyond the mandate of the SCSL to address these issues. An 
assessment	of	the	legacy	of	the	SCSL	is	thus	ultimately	tied	to	the	question	of	whether	the	Court	fulfilled	its	
criminal justice mandate. In this respect, the Prosecutor believes that the Court has reinforced some important 
principles, which include: 
- No one is above the law. Even heads of states are not above the law if 
 their criminality can be proven. 
- Power and authority come with accountability and responsibility. 
- The rule of law can and must be used to determine accountability in      
 these cases in a way that is fair to accused persons and to witnesses 
 that come before the Court. Likewise, trials must be conducted 
 by an independent, impartial and fair judiciary. 
In	achieving	its	primary	mandate,	the	Prosecutor	finds	that	the	SCSL	has	done	some	other	things	that	will	also	
serve as important legacies, such as:
- The SCSL (as all other international courts) has added to the body of      
 international jurisprudence.  
-	 The	SCSL	was	also	the	first	court	to	try	and	to	convict	individuals	for	
 recruiting or using child soldiers, for the crime of forced marriage and   
 sexual slavery, and for attacking UN peacekeepers.
Overall, in trying these cases the SCSL has developed the jurisprudence for war crimes that will be used by 
other courts including the ICC. To give an example, the ICC used the jurisprudence the SCSL developed for 
the charge of recruiting child soldiers in the Lubanga case. Another area of judicial and legal import for the 
SCSL	was	 that	 it	 reaffirmed,	 in	 the	Taylor	case,	 that	 there	was	no	head	of	state	 immunity	 for	 international	
crimes, crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. 
In addition, the Court was involved in capacity building in Sierra Leone – to the extent that its mandate allowed. 
First, the Court generated employment for locals throughout its existence, including at the leadership level. 
Both Sierra Leonean judges in the Appeals Chamber have served as presidents of the Court. The former Sierra 
Leonean Acting Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor is now the chairman of the Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption 
Commission	 (ACC-SL).	Many	Sierra	 Leonean	police	 officers	 have	worked	 for	 the	SCSL.	The	Registrar	 is	
also Sierra Leonean, and is responsible for creating the most successful outreach programme in any of the 
international criminal courts. The current Principal Defender is also a Sierra Leonean national. Thus, the Court 
has helped to expand the legal knowledge and skills of many Sierra Leoneans. The Court has also conducted 
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training with the Sierra Leonean police. In addition, the OTP has created a Sierra Leone Legal Information 
Institute (SierraLii )4, an electronic database to make the laws, judicial decisions, and judgments of the SCSL 
and the national courts of Sierra Leone public and accessible to Sierra Leoneans. In the future, the SierraLii 
will also include reports by the TRC, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and ACC-SL. 
Conclusion
‘People begin wars, people commit crimes, and people prevent or end wars’. The Prosecutor hopes that 
transitional justice mechanisms, including criminal justice options, will give people the right tools to prevent 
future	conflict	and	move	forward	from	the	conflict	they	have	endured.	The	work	of	the	Court	has	been	to	deliver	
one measure of accountability; it is just one institution dealing with the many needs facing the people of Sierra 
Leone. The Prosecutor once more referred to the NPWJ survey which asked: ‘Do you think the SCSL has had 
an impact on the development of other peace-building mechanisms in your country?’; 72% of Sierra Leoneans 
said yes. The survey further investigated whether the SCSL has contributed to greater respect for human rights 
and the rule of law in Sierra Leone. Of the 85% of Sierra Leoneans who answered yes, 35% considered the 
SCSL did so by bringing justice to those who committed crimes, 12% by the SCSL serving as a deterrent, and 
9% by the SCSL setting benchmarks. 
The Prosecutor concluded that the people of Sierra Leone and the SCSL have been engaged with each other 
but	that	it	will	be	for	the	people	of	Sierra	Leone	and	the	international	community	to	determine	how	the	Court	fits	
into the transitional justice process, how well the Court has done its work, and what legacy it will leave behind. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Much	of	the	first	round	of	discussion	revolved	around	the	effectiveness	of	the	Court	and	what	legacy	it	is	going	
to leave behind. Concerns were raised with regard to whether the SCSL managed to strengthen the domestic 
judicial system, which is still very weak to this day, whether 13 prosecutions were truly enough, and whether 
the Court could have had a larger healing effect on Sierra Leonean society had it taken on more cases in the 
past decade. Further, women and children have hardly had any voice in the criminal justice process, though the 
SCSL has at least set an example in trying crimes such as sexual slavery and forced marriage. In patriarchal 
societies	outreach	to	women	can	be	difficult,	though	in	several	SCSL	outreach	programmes,	around	50%	of	
the participants were women. 
It is certainly the case that Sierra Leone’s domestic judicial system is very weak as it is still recovering from the 
effects	of	the	conflict.	Many	professionals,	including	legal	experts,	fled	before	or	during	the	war.	Sierra	Leone	
currently has 6 million inhabitants, yet currently only around 400 attorneys. Hence the delivery of legal services 
in the country is poor and lacks local capacity to push for an elevation of the standards of domestic courts. 
There is an on-going programme in Sierra Leone to train paralegals, who could help people bring issues 
before the Courts that do not require attorneys. Overall, capacity building is still a big issue to be tackled in 
Sierra Leone. However, the SCSL at least set an example of how a court and legal system should function; in 
particular with regard to witness protection and legal defence before a court. 
Some attendees argued that 13 indictments were not enough. However, the SCSL was tied to its mandate to 
indict	those	who	bore	the	greatest	responsibility.	Probably	the	biggest	challenge	for	post-conflict	states	such	
as	Sierra	Leone	is	what	to	do	with	the	tens	of	thousands	of	others	who	committed	crimes	during	conflict	and	
who can be a destabilising factor for future peace.
In terms of the fairness of the Court, the argument was made that bad facts make bad law. Hence, if a case 
does not have enough evidence to prove guilt, courts could waste a lot of time and resources in pursuing it. In 
these instances other transitional justice mechanisms, such as TRCs, need to work collaboratively with courts. 
Writing the history of a country is not appropriate work for a criminal court – any history that is built by such 
a court is merely the by-product of a litigation process. TRCs have a much broader mandate and therefore 
greater potential to construct an accurate history.  However, the relationship of the SCSL to the TRC was 
problematised during the discussion: the TRC and the SCSL have two different mandates, consequently their 
4  See: www.sierralii.org/
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complementarity remains an issue.
Finally, the apparent lack of political will within the Sierra Leonean legal community to learn from the work done 
by	the	SCSL	was	briefly	discussed.	
UNADDRESSED QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
- How should the local justice sector be strengethened?
- How can a lack of political will to strengthen the rule of law at the local level  
 be overcome?
- What should happen to the tens of thousands in Sierra Leone who    
 committed war crimes and will never face a trial?
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Other critics argued that a SCSL would only punish 
those who bore the greatest responsibility and leave 
out a large number of perpetrators who did the 
actual killing.  This is of course true, but there were 
simply not enough funds available to prosecute 
substantially more alleged perpetrators.  This is a 
current feature of cash-strapped (and expensive) 
international justice: leave the foot soldiers to make 
apologies in Truth Commissions, and prosecute 
only those who give orders. Robertson said that this 
was an inevitable compromise, although killers who 
did not apologise in Truth Commissions should be 
prosecuted.
Sierra Leone, in Robertson’s view, is a particularly 
interesting example of how a TRC could operate 
alongside a Court. While many saw the two-track 
approach	as	a	conflicted	endeavour,	 in	 retrospect	
he argued that it went well, except for the tension 
over whether or not Chief Samuel Hinga Norman 
(founder and leader of CDF) should be allowed to 
appear before the TRC. The SCSL prevailed, and 
Norman was not able to appear before the TRC, for 
the many reasons Robertson gave in his judgment, 
but he was permitted to provide written evidence 
to the TRC or to be interviewed by them.  Refused 
the chance to speak to the nation on television, the 
Chief declined. When discussing the trial of Norman, 
Robertson noted the extraordinary irony that can 
accompany the operation of ICL: the CDF case was 
the	first	case	at	an	 international	or	hybrid	court	 in	
which the international law on the recruitment and 
use of child soldiers was developed, yet Norman 
himself had been recruited by the British army as a 
child of 14.  Robertson thought that, had he lived, 
Norman should probably have been acquitted.
For	Robertson,	 the	 legacies	of	 the	Court	can	first	
of all be found in the Court building itself, which 
has become a landmark for Sierra Leonean history. 
Most	significantly,	the	building	is	not	situated	in	The	
Hague, meaning trials (except the trial of Charles 
Taylor) took place where the victims could see 
justice being done. Further, the SCSL developed 
a workable model of a hybrid court, in which local 
judges	 had	 significant	 power.	 The	 Court	 also	 set	
precedents in determining the recruitment of child 
soldiers to be unlawful, declaring blanket amnesties 
to be invalid and declaring forced marriages to be 
a crime.
One of the court’s most important legal legacies 
was its establishment of standards of procedural 
fairness,	in	particular	via	a	Defence	Office	to	provide	
defendants with ‘equality of arms’ in adversarial 
trials. Defence had been overlooked at Nuremberg, 
where	prosecutors	ran	the	court,	and	Offices	of	the	
CORE ISSUES 
- Did the SCSL live up to its 
expectations? Geoffrey Robertson
- To what extent are international 
criminal justice institutions apolitical 
and impartial? Chris Mahony
- What is the future of international 
criminal law? Have any lessons been 
learned in the past 20 years? Phil Clark
Establishment and 
Politics of Criminal 
Tribunals in Sierra Leone 
and the Great Lakes 
Region
Reflections on the 
Establishment of the 
SCSL
Geoffrey Robertson
Robertson	was	the	first	President	of	the	Court,	and	
served on its Appeal Chamber for 5 years before 
being appointed by UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki-moon as a “distinguished jurist” member of the 
United	Nations	Justice	Council.	He	saw	significant	
improvement	in	Sierra	Leone	during	the	five	years	
he was involved with the court. He recalled that 
the establishment of the SCSL was accompanied 
by	various	criticisms.	Some	senior	political	figures	
thought that the creation of a special court was 
unnecessary and that any money to be spent on 
a court should simply be given to those who had 
been mutilated. Although acknowledging this as an 
arguable point – one that the TRC was later to make 
as well – Robertson pointed out that the money 
would not have been forthcoming at all except for 
the establishment of a court. 
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Prosecutor were overly powerful at the ICTY and 
ICTR.  Robertson and his Registrar, the late Sir 
Robin	Vincent,	established	a	Defence	Office	at	the	
SCSL so that accused persons would have legal 
help from the outset. This has now been copied 
by the ICC, one of whose courageous defence 
attorneys was arrested and held for three weeks 
when	she	visited	her	client,	Saif	al-Islam	Gaddafi,	
in Libya in June 2012.
Robertson concluded with some remarks on the 
Taylor trial, noting that the Court should not be 
finally	 assessed	 until	 the	 appeals	 process	 in	 the	
trial is complete. He argued that the Trial Chamber 
judgement	was	problematic	in	respect	of	the	specific	
intent convictions, and suggested that Charles 
Taylor, in supplying arms, ammunition and money 
to the rebels in Sierra Leone, did no more than 
President Reagan in supplying arms, ammunition 
and money to the Contras in Nicaragua.  Whether 
this is an exculpation for Taylor, or a condemnation 
of Reagan, may depend on your political views, but 
at least it serves a warning to those who sell arms 
to mass-murderers (e.g. the Assad regime in Syria) 
that they may one day be held accountable.
 
The Special Court of 
Sierra Leone – Political 
Justice?
Chris Mahony
The story of the creation of the SCSL often begins 
with President Kabbah’s letter to the UN, asking for 
the establishment of an international criminal court. 
Mahony challenged this common perception and 
discussed the creation of the SCSL not only from a 
geopolitical perspective, but also by shedding light 
on the role played by all actors who were principally 
involved in the establishment and design of the 
Court.  
During the late 1990s, the UK as well as the US had 
diametrically opposed interests in the West African 
region. While the US favoured Charles Taylor’s 
presidency (and by extension the RUF), the UK was 
a	firm	supporter	of	Kabbah’s	government	in	Sierra	
Leone.	In	the	 later	stages	of	 the	conflict,	between	
1999-2000, these dynamics changed. After a 
coalition between the AFRC and the RUF from 
1997 to 2000, the army reoriented their allegiance 
back towards the GoSL thereby having a dramatic 
effect on the security situation in the country. At the 
same time, the chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Affairs Appropriations Committee, Senator Judd 
Gregg, froze payments on debt of over $1.7bn owed 
by the US to the UN, until US policy in support of 
Taylor changed. Senator Gregg not only maintained 
a	 close	 relationship	 with	 officials	 from	 the	 UK	
government, he was also in regular communication 
with them on Sierra Leonean issues. 
This blockage of funds caused a shortage of 
money for the disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) of RUF and other combatants. 
When the RUF combatants learned that they had 
to	disarm	without	any	benefits,	 they	 took	500	UN	
peacekeepers hostage in May 2000. The Clinton 
administration had no other choice but to concede 
to the British due to public pressure and the 
embarrassment of its inability to pay its UN dues. 
In a meeting between Senator Gregg and the US 
Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, it was 
decided that the US would release the money and 
change its political position towards Taylor. The plan 
was to force Taylor from power using a war crimes 
court, amongst other instruments of pressure that 
included a US-funded rebel insurgency, economic 
sanctions and support for Liberian opposition to 
Taylor. For Mahony this successful plan provides 
an important counter-narrative to the dominant 
account of why the SCSL was established. 
Mahony explained that the UNSC was opposed 
to being responsible for another expensive 
international criminal tribunal, believing that if the 
US wanted to create an SCSL, they should pay for 
it themselves, with or without the support of other 
governments. As a consequence of accepting this 
role, the US did not have to negotiate the design of 
the SCSL with all the other members of the UNSC 
– as was the case with the ICTY and the ICTR. 
Notably, it also had greater physical leverage over 
the Court. For instance, prosecutors and judges 
were	continuously	asking	the	US	for	more	finance,	
giving	the	US	significant	potential	influence	on	the	
operation of justice in Sierra Leone. 
Thus, when the SCSL is put into its political 
context, the reality is that this institution, not 
unlike its predecessors in international law, was 
designed by politicians (and civil servants acting 
on the instructions of politicians) with political 
goals in mind. Mahony did not dispute that some 
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of these international and hybrid mechanisms 
serve a purpose in achieving some form of justice. 
However, if the goal is to address impunity, it is hard 
to see how institutions that are highly susceptible to 
political pressure can be said to end impunity. In the 
case of the SCSL, it was clear from the onset that 
nobody from the British government, for instance, 
was ever going to be prosecuted. The same can 
be said of the design of the ICC, which will never 
allow the indictment of Vladimir Putin for aiding and 
abetting the Syrian government or the US for its 
support in Yemen. 
The Obsolescence of 
International Law? 
Comparative Perspectives 
on International Criminal 
Justice from the African 
Great Lakes 
Phil Clark
Drawing on the examples of Eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda, 
Clark gave a comparative perspective on the 
Sierra Leonean case. In the light of the forthcoming 
closure of the SCSL as well as the ICTR and ICTY, 
his talk primarily focused on two questions: 
- After 20 years of various attempts at international 
justice, what is the outlook for the whole domain of 
ICJ? 
- What are the main lessons that have been learned 
(or not learned) from the past 20 years of various 
attempts to use international justice to deal with 
mass crimes and crimes against humanity? 
For Clark there has not only been very limited 
learning by ICL institutions in the past 20 years, he 
also doubts whether the international community 
should be putting so much emphasis on institutions 
like the ICC and other forms of international law 
in the future. Proponents of ICJ, he argued, often 
justify ICL by stating that a) it can deliver practical 
benefits	to	people	who	have	lived	through	conflict,	
and b) ICL is insulated from political interference 
and hence is neutral, impartial and able to deliver a 
form of apolitical justice that could not be delivered 
by domestic institutions. 
In his view, however, the idea of neutrality has 
created a sense of detachment and disengagement 
at the heart of ICL. He referred to the example of 
a senior ICTR judge who purposely has never 
been to Rwanda as this would – according to the 
judge – entail the risk of becoming emotionally and 
psychologically too attached to the context of the 
post-genocide situation and consequently diminish 
the judge’s capacity to deliver impartial and neutral 
justice. 
There is a central tension here - is ICL about having 
tangible	 benefits	 to	 local	 populations	 or	 should	 it	
hover above the domestic political fray? Can courts 
have both positive domestic effects and also be 
neutral and impartial, i.e. not captured by local 
interests?	He	defined	four	main	problems	that	stem	
from this tension between neutrality and the desire 
to	have	real	benefits	on	the	ground:	
First, especially in the Great Lakes region but 
also beyond, one can observe that international 
criminal law practices have failed to understand 
the	nature	of	conflict	in	the	particular	settings	they	
operate. The post-cold war era saw new forms 
of	 violence	 and	 diffused	 forms	 of	 conflict.	 These	
new	 forms	 of	 conflict	 rarely	 comply	 with	 strict	
ideas of chains of command and they challenge 
hierarchical understandings of dispute and war. In 
many instances, violence is carried out by a large 
number of civilians. Consequently, it becomes 
more	difficult	to	determine	who	is	the	most	culpable	
and hence bore the greatest responsibility. For 
Clark perceptions of who is most responsible for 
the crimes committed can differ tremendously 
between international legal practitioners and 
locals.  He criticised ICL practitioners for their 
insufficient	engagement	with	local	populations	and	
for disregarding their understandings of who should 
be prosecuted. 
The second problem refers to how ICJ has 
coordinated its activities with domestic justice 
processes, political actors and institutions. This can 
be observed in the case of the ICTR and the ICC 
in the extent to which domestic political actors have 
instrumentalised the institutions. In many ways 
this has shaped how ICL has been conducted and 
explains	why	e.g.	 government	 officials	 in	Uganda	
or the Eastern DRC have not been prosecuted by 
the ICC. In short, international justice has failed to 
sufficiently	separate	itself	from	the	domestic	frame	
due to very close working relationships with the 
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governments in question. 
Third, and somewhat in tension with his second 
point, Clark raised the issue of complementarity 
between international and domestic levels. Not 
only is there a sense of complacency around 
the language of complementarity, but there is 
also a hierarchy of institutions, with international 
institutions tending to dominate their domestic 
counterparts, and international actors assuming 
that the ‘domestic’ sphere is mired in politics or 
otherwise beneath their more noble concerns. 
Lastly, he questioned what kind of impact ICL 
is really having on the lives of citizens affected 
by	 conflict.	 If	 tribunals	wanted	 to	 deliver	 tangible	
benefits	 to	 local	 populations,	 legacy	 planning	
should have been built into them from day one. 
What currently happens, however, is that it is 
smuggled in at the end phase of these institutions. 
Local capacity building or strengthening domestic 
judiciaries seems to be an afterthought. The idea of 
positive complementarity used to be very popular 
at the ICC. These days it has lost ground, with 
Prosecutor Ocampo once stating: ‘We [the ICC] 
are not a development agency’. Hence, it seems 
that ICL has no long-term commitment to, or effect 
on, building local capacity to deliver justice. 
Reflecting	 upon	 these	 four	 core	 issues,	 Clark	
concluded that important lessons from ad hoc 
and hybrid tribunals have not been learned in the 
past twenty years. Yet, there is enormous potential 
and innovations at the domestic level, particularly 
in places such as Rwanda, Uganda and the 
Congo. He drew on the examples of the Gacaca 
in Rwanda, domestic reform processes in the DRC 
which enabled local courts to try suspects that are 
more	 senior	 rebels	 or	 government	 officials	 than	
the ICC is targeting, and local mobile gender units 
being employed to deal with sexual violence cases 
in South Kivu. Clark stressed that more attention 
should be paid to these different types of institutions 
given that after twenty years, ICL does not seem to 
offer improved standards of justice. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The short discussion centred on the extent to which 
legacy planning is now central to ICL mechanisms, 
and the purposes of ICL. On legacy, views were 
expressed that the SCSL has a better record on 
this than other courts – notably the ICTR (which 
has only recently started training programmes for 
local legal personnel) and the ICC. Over the last 
few years, the OTP at the ICC has seemed to move 
away from the idea that the Court should deliver 
tangible	 benefits	 to	 local	 populations	 in	 favour	 of	
more austere ideas of delivering justice for the sake 
of	 the	 victims	 of	 conflict.	 Lack	 of	 legacy	 planning	
and engagement with local people can be said to 
detach the ICC from the very people it is supposed 
to serve. 
In terms of the purposes of ICL, it was argued 
that if ICJ is supposed to engage with the national 
judiciary in the form of capacity building or training, 
first	 we	 have	 to	 be	 clear	 whether	 the	 purpose	 of	
ICL is purely retributive or also restorative. If it is 
significantly	restorative,	then	local	politics	must	play	
a role as domestic populations must have some say 
in what it is that they want their justice system to 
achieve. 
UNADDRESSED QUESTIONS AND 
CHALLENGES AHEAD
 -  Can ICJ be de-politicised? 
 How can local judiciaries be   
 strengthened without 
 international courts getting   
 involved in domestic politics?
 -  Do hybrid courts really let    
 local justice prevail? 
21
Legacies of the Special 
Court in Sierra Leone
The Trial of the Civilian 
Defence Force: 
A Perverse Legacy of the 
SCSL 
Lansana Gberie
Gberie stressed that he was speaking neither as 
a staff member of the Security Council Report nor 
as a legal scholar but as a Sierra Leonean and 
someone who had, during course of his work as a 
journalist in the war, met almost all the main players 
in	 the	 conflict	 as	 the	majority	 of	 those	 who	 were	
later indicted. 
Although he became one of the main critics of the 
SCSL, he was among those who advocated for 
an international court to try those responsible for 
the war. He was convinced that Sierra Leone did 
not have the local institutions or the capacity to try 
those	who	had	committed	horrific	atrocities.	 In	his	
view, some of the most responsible individuals were 
not Sierra Leoneans, but men such as Charles 
Taylor,	 Muammar	 Gaddafi	 and	 Blaise	 Compaoré	
who the Sierra Leonean courts could not touch. 
Gberie never expected that the Court would also 
indict people from the CDF, in particular Chief 
Hinga Norman. For Gberie, Norman had behaved 
honourably in organising people at the community 
level to resist the cruelties committed by the RUF 
and other players, and he should not have been 
tried. 
Trying leaders of the CDF, in Gberie’s opinion, does 
not	correctly	reflect	the	history	of	the	war.	The	TRC	
report documents that most of the crimes in the war 
were committed by the RUF. The CDF can be held 
accountable for a very small percentage – the same 
or less than ECOWAS forced. Yet no-one from 
ECOWAS was put on trial. 
The	 CDF	 trial	 was	 also	 flawed	 in	 not	 giving	
adequate support to the other two defendants in 
the case, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, 
who were illiterate and could not have understood 
the legal language and operation of the Court. For 
Gberie,	one	of	 the	major	flaws	within	 international	
transitional justice is that it cannot be effective if 
the communities in question do not understand the 
vocabulary and practices of that justice. 
Gberie also criticised the use of experts at the CDF 
trial to establish the extent to which CDF atrocities 
were systematic and organised. The OTP used 
(and the Trial Chamber later relied on) a Colonel 
in the British military who had never been to Sierra 
Leone to determine the organisational structure of 
the CDF during the war. The ‘expert’ spent a very 
short period of time in Sierra Leone, during which he 
interviewed a total of seven people whose names 
were all supplied to him by the SCSL OTP. In his 
testimony and written report, the Colonel concluded 
that the CDF did have a recognisable hierarchy 
and command structure, with Norman performing 
the	 role	 of	 a	 commander	 during	 the	 conflict	 –	 a	
position that both Gberie and the defence dispute. 
He	further	contended	that	supporting	staff	officers	
surrounded Norman, and that there was a large 
number of hierarchically structured CDF units 
based in Talia (Kenema, Eastern Sierra Leone). 
However, after completion of the report, the colonel 
admitted his lack of knowledge about the history 
of	the	kamajors	(CDF	fighters).	It	was	unknown	to	
him that the CDF was largely composed of people 
who were displaced in refugee camps because of 
rebel attacks, who claimed to have formed a civilian 
CORE ISSUES
- What is the real legacy of the 
CDF trial? Lansana Gberie
- How is the SCSL legacy 
constructed by various actors 
involved, and how can legacy be 
theorised? Viviane Dittrich
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defence force to defend their own communities. 
Gberie concluded that the position the SCSL took 
on being apolitical actually prevented it from doing 
justice in the CDF case. The GoSL actually had a 
responsibility, unexamined by the Court, to resist 
insurgencies and assaults on the state. It was 
incapable of doing so and consequently the CDF 
emerged as an organisation to protect civilians 
who were oppressed by rebel leaders.  Neither the 
government nor the international community offered 
protection. The emergence of the CDF, in Gberie’s 
view, is an extraordinary phenomenon that should 
be applauded. But instead, this kind of civilian 
defence mechanism was criminalised – and this will 
certainly have a destructive impact on the legacy of 
ICJ in West Africa.
Legacies of the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone
Viviane Dittrich
With only the appeals judgment in the Charles Taylor 
case pending (currently anticipated to be issued in 
September 2013), debates about the Court’s legacy 
have become increasingly topical. The SCSL will be 
the	 first	 contemporary	 ICT	 to	 ceremonially	 close.	
Against this background, Dittrich focused on the 
assessment of the court’s legacy efforts, the various 
actors involved, and how legacy can be theorised. 
The SCSL’s institutional focus towards completion 
and beyond 
The limited lifespan of the SCSL was explicitly 
anticipated in Article 23 of the original agreement, 
which stipulates that it ‘shall be terminated by 
agreement of the Parties upon completion of the 
judicial activities of the Special Court’. On 6 October 
2004, the Management Committee of the Court 
adopted a so-called completion strategy which 
was later repeatedly revised. Due to the on-going 
obligations of the Court (e.g. oversight and revision 
of sentences, witness protection, trying fugitives or 
the management of archives) a successor institution 
appeared increasingly necessary. In an agreement 
between the UN and GoSL that was concluded in 
August 2010, it was decided to create a Residual 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (RSCSL). As the 
Court is winding down and nearing institutional 
closure, focus inside and outside the Court turned 
to the legacy it is leaving. However, Dittrich argues 
that serious attention given to legacy should not 
just start once a tribunal closes. Although legacy 
may temporally overlap with both completion and 
residual or post-completion issues, in her view, it is 
very important to clearly distinguish between these 
interrelated but separate dimensions.  
Legacy discourse and conceptualisation
In the past decade, legacy building has been shaped 
by social and political expectations. In recent 
years, the international community had to face the 
criticism that simply convicting a number of alleged 
perpetrators	may	not	be	sufficient	to	have	a	broad	
impact	on	post-conflict	countries	 in	 their	 transition	
to societal stability, peace and reconciliation. First, 
it	seems	important	to	agree	on	a	definition	of	legacy.	
In its 8th Annual Report in 2011, the SCSL refers to 
a	 definition	 introduced	 by	 the	UNHCR	 policy	 tool	
‘Maximizing	the	Legacy	of	Hybrid	Courts’,		defining	
legacy as a ‘lasting impact on bolstering the rule of 
law (…) by conducting effective trials to contribute to 
ending impunity, while also strengthening domestic 
judicial capacity.’ A number of publications have 
taken	 up	 this	 definition.	 However,	 Dittrich	 argued	
against	 the	 one-sidedness	 of	 the	 definition	 and	
stressed the variety of legacies. Dittrich builds on 
a process analytic model she recently published to 
capture the cycles of legacies and their continuous 
(re-) construction within a diverse actor landscape. 
Her model perceives legacy as a dynamic process 
of constant construction. This is in contrast to a 
linear or unidirectional perception of legacy as an 
act of leaving. 
Legacies of the SCSL
As an institution, the SCSL has assumed the 
role of legacy leaver. A legacy working group and 
a committee were created and the Court also 
established	a	legacy	officer	post.	In	addition,	legacy	
programmes were launched such as the Site Project, 
Peace Museum and National Witness Protection 
Programme. These projects are a projection into 
the future and constitute remains and reminders 
of	 the	 institution	and	 the	post-conflict	 transition	of	
Sierra Leone. Dittrich emphasised, however, that 
legacies aren’t solely created by a few projects 
before closure, but are shaped and constructed all 
along. Dittrich’s analysis focused on the diversity 
of actors involved in legacy construction. Dittrich 
further argued that there is no single perspective, 
even in Sierra Leone. She discussed various 
expectations regarding what the legacies of an ICT 
or hybrid court are and should be. 
Finally, Dittrich concluded that the upcoming 
closure of the Court provides critical momentum 
for	the	institution	itself,	Sierra	Leone’s	post-conflict	
transition and the wider transitional justice landscape. 
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The SCSL has shown institutional innovation and 
pioneered various legacy developments – though 
the political as opposed to purely legal legacies of 
the court are as yet unacknowledged. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Many questions focused on the CDF trial. In 
particular, participants challenged whether one can 
really excuse individuals for crimes committed only 
because he or she was part of a civilian defence 
force – and some noted that the RUF also claimed 
to be seeking democracy (in, for instance, their 
manifesto ‘Footpaths to Democracy’. Should the 
RUF therefore be excused their crimes? Those 
opposed to such a view argued that there was 
evidence	 from	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 the	 conflict	
that the RUF were not serious about a freedom or 
democracy agenda. They began to commit atrocities 
at an early stage, and these abuses were often not 
conducted in a systematic manner. The CDF was 
formed in response to the RUF driving people into 
refugee camps, and only later grew to a bigger 
movement. The effect of prosecuting the CDF could 
be to demobilise ordinary people in future who seek 
to actively resist atrocities or predatory regimes. 
Other questions concerned the legacy of the SCSL 
and the ICTs, for instance whether and how to edu-
cate young Sierra Leoneans about what happened 
during the war and the extent to which legacy build-
ing is done in consultation with the larger popula-
tion. It is not yet clear what kind of educational pro-
grammes the proposed ‘peace museum’ will offer, 
nor how involved domestic populace will (or wants 
to) be in legacy programmes. Thus far, however, 
legacy proposals do target locals as well as re-
searchers and tourists.                   
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
UNADDRESSED QUESTIONS AND 
CHALLENGES AHEAD
-  What impact has the CDF trial  
 had on other governments  
 and popular movements in the  
	 region	–	or	further	afield?	
 Are civilians now less likely to  
 rise up against corrupt 
 governments for fear of being  
 prosecuted? 
-		 Who	defines/	should	define	the		
 legacy of a war crimes court? 
-  Should legacy projects 
 encompass a broader 
 peace-building and    
 development agenda or should 
 they be more restricted to 
 history and effects of courts?
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PART II
Non-judicial Approaches and 
Addressing the Legacies of 
Violence
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and 
Restorative Justice          
CORE ISSUES 
- How did the TRC contribute to 
the peace-building process in 
Sierra Leone? 
Joe A.D. Alie
- What are the main criticisms of 
the TRC and the main lessons 
to be learned from its work?
 Rebekka Friedman
- What are the tensions,
and instances of convergence, 
between victim-centred 
approaches to transitional justice 
and DDR programmes? 
Chandra Sriram 
   
The Truth and 
Reconciliation 
Commission and Peace-
building in Sierra Leone
Joe A.D. Alie
Alie argued that transitional justice mechanisms 
have made important contributions to peace-
building	 in	 Sierra	 Leone.	 Reflecting	 on	 the	
different procedures that have been put in place, 
he argued that prosecution is not always a 
suitable instrument for post-war justice in Africa 
because:
 -it could further polarise communities rather 
than having a healing effect due to victims, 
perpetrators and survivors living in close 
proximity to each other;
-the formal justice system may not have the 
capacity to properly address all committed 
crimes	during	a	conflict;
-it can entail many political risks: the Sierra 
Leonean war, like many other wars in 
contemporary Africa, involved the active 
participation of a large number of young people - 
prosecuting	them	may	reignite	conflict.
Therefore, in concert with the international com-
munity, Sierra Leone opted to establish a TRC, 
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as	also	outlined	in	the	Lomé	Peace	Agreement,	Ar-
ticle 26. The TRC began its work in the second half 
of	2002	and	had	five	main	objectives:	
-to create an impartial historical record of violations 
and abuses of human rights and IHL related to the 
armed	conflict	in	Sierra	Leone	from	the	beginning	of	
the	conflict	in	1991	to	the	signing	of	the	Lomé	peace	
agreement in 1999;
-to address impunity; 
-to respond to the needs of victims; 
-to promote healing and reconciliation;
-to prevent a repetition of the violations and  
abuses suffered.
The TRC was created to provide a forum for people 
to tell their stories, and to use these (and further 
research) to produce a historic record that would 
contribute to the reconciliation process in the coun-
try. Equally important, the TRC was expected to in-
vestigate	 the	 causes	of	 conflict	 in	 the	absence	of	
functioning government organs. Through the crea-
tion of a historical record and a series of recom-
mendations,	the	TRC	contributed	significantly	to	the	
peace-building process.
For Alie, peace-building is a holistic and long-term 
process. It involves a transformation of structures 
that produce or promote inequalities, historical dif-
ferences, intolerance, exploitation, or other ills that 
lead to violence. It means moving a post-war country 
away from negative peace towards positive peace. 
In this context, the TRC did recognise the role of 
traditional institutions in reconciliation and peace-
building. He refers to the example of a committee 
for forgiveness that was established for the hear-
ings of perpetrators. In other instances, traditional 
ceremonies took place in some communities as 
part of the healing process. The TRC report was 
also forthright in naming and blaming those respon-
sible for the atrocities committed during the war, 
with the RUF leaders being accorded the greatest 
responsibility. The report also recommended a se-
ries of government actions, covering areas such as 
the protection of human rights, the establishment of 
the	 rule	of	 law,	 the	 security	 services,	 fighting	 cor-
ruption, youth, women, children, mineral and other 
resources and promoting good governance. These 
recommendations have led to the establishment of 
key post-war institutions such as the Human Rights 
Commission and the new Gender Laws. A youth 
commission has also been set up but it is yet to take 
full effect. 
Although Sierra Leone has made considerable pro-
gress towards reconciliation since the end of the war, 
there are still major obstacles to peace-building: cor-
ruption, proper management of the country’s natural 
resources, poverty and unemployment. A large per-
centage of the country’s population – approximately 
6 million people —live on less than US$1.25 a day. 
Human rights violations frequently occur, especially 
by the police. The government has yet to work on a 
national vision as proposed by the TRC. 
While	the	TRC	did	not	have	the	financial	means	to	
compensate the victims, it nevertheless made rec-
ommendations regarding the special fund for war 
victims. However, little has been achieved in spite of 
the existence of the UN Peace-building Fund, which 
provided funds for war victims to be managed by 
the country’s National Commission for Social Action 
(NACSA). 
Allie concluded that the TRC contributed greatly to 
peace-building in Sierra Leone. The Commission 
enumerated	 the	 antecedents	 of	 the	 conflict,	 and	
made far-reaching recommendations to promote 
democracy, the rule of law, minimising poverty and 
enhancing wealth creation and the equitable distri-
bution of the natural resources of the state. How-
ever, the recommendations are far from fully imple-
mented. If the GoSL commits to implementing them 
all, Sierra Leone will indeed move successfully from 
post-conflict	recovery	towards	prosperity	and	devel-
opment.
The TRC: Legacy and 
Evaluation
Rebekka Friedman
As	scholarship	on	TJ	has	become	more	self-reflec-
tive and professionalised many scholars have start-
ed to question the normative and political purposes 
of TJ and the interests it represents. In addition, the 
trend is globalising and local practices are being dis-
seminated into new contexts – effectively linking the 
global with the local in transitional justice practice. In 
the case of Sierra Leone, Friedman argued that situ-
ation is further complicated by issues of culture and 
legitimacy, which tie into broader politics of repre-
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sentation and authenticity. By drawing on her work 
about restorative justice and TRCs, she made the 
following observations:
First, TRCs often fade away. TRCs often begin as 
high	profile	mechanisms	and	are	usually	set	up	for	
a very short period of time (one- to one and a half 
years). International commissioners leave after 
these bodies cease operation. Too little attention is 
paid	 to	TRC	 follow-up	and	how	 their	findings	and	
recommendations are implemented.
Second, TRCs tend to fare poorly in impact assess-
ment studies. Academic or comparative quantita-
tive	studies	on	democratisation	often	find	that	TRCs	
have very little impact in comparison to criminal tri-
als	with	 regard	 to	 quantifiable	measures	 such	 as	
the enforcement of human rights. Ethnographic ac-
counts often criticise a lack of impact on the micro 
level and may highlight the potential for TRCs to 
reopen old wounds. Similarly, much of the literature 
on Sierra Leone has taken a critical orientation to-
wards the TRC, arguing that the Commission was 
too legalistic or did not resonate with local culture 
and practices. 
Third, criticisms of TRCs tie into the politics of le-
gitimacy and authenticity within countries. In Sierra 
Leone, dissatisfaction with the overly centralised 
and	 internationally-influenced	 TRC	 process	 led	
to the rise of new movements, for instance, local 
reconciliation processes such as Fambul Tok (see 
Roundtable Part III, Jon Lunn), which was estab-
lished as a community-level alternative to the more 
centralised TRC. 
 
Overall, the Sierra Leonean TRC was not only a 
heavily criticised process, but it was also incom-
plete and lost momentum over time. However, 
Friedman emphasised that while TRCs are often 
seen as formal mechanisms alongside tribunals, 
TRCs	are	in	fact	a	remarkably	fluid	form	of	TJ.	This	
is particularly the case when compared with inter-
national tribunals, as there are far fewer guidelines 
on what TRCs are supposed to achieve as opposed 
to criminal tribunals.  She further argued that aca-
demic	scholarship	often	tends	to	conflate	TRCs	and	
evaluations are based on understandings associ-
ated with previous commissions. Here the South 
African legacy is extremely pervasive, as it led to a 
therapeutic understanding of TRCs, linked to indi-
vidual healing and interpersonal reconciliation. For 
Friedman, this understanding of what reconciliation 
means and how the impact of TRCs should be as-
sessed is too narrow. Although TRCs have become 
part	of	an	 increasingly	globalised	field,	 they	are	a	
highly varied among themselves, and should be 
evaluated according to their broader societal con-
tribution to peace building and democratisation in 
their	specific	contexts.	
For Friedman, the TRC in Sierra Leone was unique 
in many ways. It was established as a political com-
promise	in	the	1999	Lomé	Peace	Agreement	in	an	
attempt to bring some measure of accountability for 
victims and to start reintegration while guaranteeing 
peace. In the course of its existence, it became a 
heavily internationalised process but nevertheless 
managed to address a number of domestic chal-
lenges, including the large number of child soldiers 
involved in the war and the marginalisation of youth 
prior	to	the	conflict,	and	the	large	number	of	women	
and girls who experienced sexual violence or were 
forced into sexual slavery during the war. It recog-
nised that perpetrators were often victims of the war 
themselves, which led to the Commission taking a 
strongly restorative and non-punitive orientation. 
The Commission also contributed to a civic nation-
building process through holding hearings and mak-
ing recommendations. Here, Friedman stressed 
that most of the TRC’s recommendations were le-
gally binding. And although there were sometimes 
tensions between the TRC and the SCSL, at least 
there was a division of labour between the two bod-
ies. In particular, the TRC dealt well with the issue 
of child soldiers and was inclusive of women and 
children in its work. The TRC’s recommendations 
were	designed	to	benefit	the	community	or	country	
as a whole, as opposed to promoting narrow inter-
ests.  
However, the TRC is still heavily criticised by some. 
Criticisms include: the nature of the TRC’s report it-
self, particularly that it is too even-handed because 
it failed to judge the (il)legitimacy of the RUF; that 
the Commission had a weak impact in rural areas; 
TRC in Sierra Leone
Source | TRC: http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/,
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and that it engaged poorly with local traditions and 
communities. Friedman argued that there is also 
a sense among participants and direct stakehold-
ers of the TRC that the Commission has betrayed 
them.	 People	 who	 had	 testified	 or	 made	 recom-
mendations noted that despite active participation 
little or nothing was done for them afterwards.  
Friedman’s interviewees also often felt that the pro-
cess was targeted more towards ex-combatants 
than victims; that there was a lack of reparations on 
the individual level; and that reforms had not been 
carried out leaving most of the causes of the war 
unaddressed. Victims continue to live in isolation in 
war-wounded camps for amputees and women or 
are stigmatised and marginalised within their com-
munities. Friedman recalled a particular interview in 
the Grafton War Wounded and Polio Camp, when 
a TRC participant told her that he had ‘opened his 
heart’ at the TRC but that nothing had been done 
for	him	afterwards.	He	also	testified	at	the	SCSL	tri-
al of Issa Sesay and while he was not a proponent 
of punitive justice, he at least felt that the Court had 
done something with its sentence, repeating the 
time of day and date of Sesay’s sentencing.  
Friedman	concluded	that	reflecting	on	the	criticisms	
of TJ can assist in learning about the potential of 
these mechanisms and how to improve them. The 
TRC raised a lot of hope – over 8,000 people testi-
fied	and	the	Commission	had	a	lot	of	momentum.	
While many of the academic accounts come to criti-
cal conclusions, thereby dismissing TRCs as inef-
fective, culturally inappropriate or as less valuable 
mechanisms of TJ, it is nevertheless crucial to dis-
tinguish between rejection of the TRC and frustra-
tion and disappointment in its work.  It is essential 
that the right lessons are learned. For Friedman, 
this particularly implies the importance of following 
up for victims and sustainable and continuous im-
pact monitoring. 
Legacies of Violence in 
Sierra Leone
Chandra Sriram
Victims and Ex-combatants in Sierra 
Leone. 
In peace-building processes, the interests of victims 
and ex-combatants often seem to be diametrically 
opposed. On the one hand, there are concerns for 
victims (and their rights and reparations), and on 
the other hand, much focus is on the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process of 
ex-combatants. For Sriram these two peace-build-
ing activities constitute competing poles in transi-
tional justice that should be analysed in tandem. 
Sriram began with remarks on victim-centred jus-
tice as a normative paradigm in TJ. Normative ar-
guments for such justice emphasise the harm done 
to	 victims	 during	 conflict	 and	 the	 need	 to	 repair	
relationships. It becomes possible for offenders to 
reintegrate into the community and for wider so-
cial trust to be restored if victims’ needs are met. 
Many practitioners argue for victim-centred- rather 
than solely retributive justice, or communally- rather 
than individually-focused accountability, and practi-
cal measures to incorporate victims into traditional 
justice processes have increased in recent years. 
This is evidenced by the creation of a victims’ trust 
fund at the ICC, the provision for participation by 
victims in proceedings in such institutions as the 
ICC and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia (ECCC), the expectation that TRCs 
will	provide	specific	moral	and	material	benefits	to	
victims, and the growth of reparation programmes, 
as well as UN guidance and principles pertaining to 
restorative justice. 
However, this approach entails various challenges. 
First, there tends to be a presumption in TJ process-
es that all victims have similar interests. There is a 
common consensus that individuals may be both 
victims and perpetrators (as is the case for child 
soldiers), but the sophistication of understanding of 
victims does not extend much beyond this. In her 
view,	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘victim’	 has	 been	 reified	 and	
individualised, leading to TJ ignoring the fact that 
much	of	the	harm	done	by	conflict	is	done	to	collec-
tives rather than individuals. A number of her Sierra 
Leonean interviewees noted that in some sense 
everyone who lived in the country during the war 
is a victim. In addition, there is the risk that victims 
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are used to serve the purposes of the reintegration 
of perpetrators, and are coerced into ‘reconciling’. 
Victims are too frequently expected (often by the 
very external TJ actors who promote victim-centred 
justice) to forgive a wide variety of perpetrators so 
that the community can move forward. 
Sriram discussed this trend with regards to DDR 
programmes	 in	 post-conflict	 peacekeeping	 and	
peace-building missions. DDR programmes are 
designed not only to disarm former combatants, 
but also to promote their return to a peaceful civil-
ian life, or their integration into new and reformed 
state security forces. As such, they usually entail 
a mixture of training and education, and in some 
cases cash payments, to induce the transforma-
tion of former combatants, and in some cases to 
make their return more attractive to communities. 
However, there is a pronounced clash between 
victim-centred/traditional justice models and DDR 
processes, as can be seen in the Sierra Leonean 
case. 
Many consider Sierra Leone a great success with 
regards to its DDR programme. The original was 
to disarm and reintegrate 30,0000-45,000 peo-
ple. However, 75,000 eventually went through the 
DDR process. As is often the case, this included a 
large number of people who did not qualify, and did 
not include all combatants, but many combatants 
(perhaps the majority) did enter the process. The 
process included the standard DDR procedures: 
collection and destruction of weapons and ammu-
nition, demobilisation centres, subsistence allow-
ances, and packages involving cash and training. 
Unfortunately, the training programmes in particular 
did not live up to expectations. The training did not 
map onto the employment opportunities available 
and there were not (and are still not now) enough 
employment opportunities in Sierra Leone to en-
able many ex-combatants to work. Also, the qual-
ity of the training programmes was weak, meaning 
even employers who had jobs to offer did not want 
to hire ex-combatants for reasons unrelated to the 
conflict,	 but	 focussed	 instead	 on	 the	 low	 quality	
training they had received. There was also an ex-
clusion of women and girls in the processes. Fur-
ther, the imperatives of victim-centred approaches 
and DDR programmes resulted in the creation of a 
sense of unfairness among the broader population. 
DDR packages were completed by 2004, whereas 
reparations did not start before 2009, lasted no 
longer than a year, and did not have a large im-
pact on victims, meaning ex-combatants seemed to 
have gained far more from TJ than victims. 
In terms of other TJ processes in Sierra Leone, 
Sriram listed a number of criticisms. In the case 
of the TRC the Commission was quasi-legalistic 
and as such did not resonate with dominant Sierra 
Leonean	approaches	to	dealing	with	conflict,	harm,	
responsibility and forgiveness. With regards to the 
SCSL, accessibility for the average Sierra Leonean 
tends to be grossly overstated in the literature. The 
trials were run without any concessions to making 
the proceedings comprehensible to the average 
Sierra Leonean – even trained international lawyer 
could not understand all of the proceedings. The 
reparations programme was not only extremely lim-
ited with just US $3m in 2009 (funded by the UN 
Peace-building Fund) and $1m in the pipeline from 
UN Women, but when money was forthcoming, 
beneficiaries	were	often	unable	to	differentiate	be-
tween payments made as reparations and a variety 
of other humanitarian or developmental assistance 
payments.	In	sum,	there	were	significant	problems	
with each TJ mechanism individually, as well as fur-
ther problems when they tried to work together. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Participants questioned whether tension between 
victim-centred justice and DDR processes stems 
from local justice practices per se, or whether it 
should be regarded as caused by the way in which 
external actors engage with these processes. More 
generally, both speakers and participants found that 
reintegration processes of victims and perpetrators 
were often over-romanticised. There needs to be a 
much more critical consideration of which kind of lo-
cal and formal mechanisms have the most positive 
impact on reintegration processes. 
UN Peacekeepers registering ex-combatants at 
Segbwema. 
Source | http://www.sierra-leone.org/segbwema-2000.html 
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UNADDRESSED QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
 -  What can be done to make the impact of TRCs more sustainable, 
 inclusive and better monitored? 
-  What positive lessons can be learned from the TRC? 
-  To what extent should re-integration efforts remain in local hands and to what   
 extent should they be externally managed? 
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PART III
Local Perceptions and 
Traditional forms of Justice 
ROUNDTABLE
Joe A.D. Alie
In his closing remarks, Alie discussed traditional mechanisms for accountability and justice. He drew on 
the	findings	of	his	recently	published	chapter	‘Traditional	Justice	and	Human	Rights	in	post-war	African	
countries. Prospects and Challenges’ in an edited volume by Intersentia entitled: ‘African Perspectives 
on Tradition and Justice’ (2012). 
There	 have	 been	 many	 models	 of	 accountability	 and	 conflict	 resolution.	 The	 literature	 suggests,	
however, that these mechanisms come with many shortcomings, and what seems to be missing is the 
use of indigenous institutions to complement the work of other TJ mechanisms. Uganda and Rwanda 
serve as good examples of how different approached to justice can work together. 
Many of the criticisms of formal TJ mechanisms revolve around the amount of money and time they 
require and their remoteness from the people who were affected	 by	 conflict.	 In	Alie’s	 view,	 victims	
do	not	play	a	sufficiently	 important	 role	 in	such	mechanisms.	Because	of	 these	criticisms	 there	 is	a	
growing tendency to complement formal with local mechanisms. Against this background, Alie argued 
that tradition-based mechanisms are becoming more relevant for a number of reasons: 
CORE ISSUES
- How important are tradition-based mechanisms in assigning accountability 
in	post-conflict	Africa?	Joe A.D. Alie
- How have local and traditional forms of reconciliation worked in Sierra 
Leone? Jon Lunn
- In which circumstances are traditional justice mechanisms valuable/ 
harmful? Tim Allen
-To what extent do past TJ processes still matter to Sierra Leoneans? 
Nathalie Wlodarczyk
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- Language:  
 Most traditional justice mechanisms use the 
 community language and do not entail legal jargon. 
- Geographical proximity:  
 Traditional mechanisms are set up within the 
	 community/ies	that	suffered	during	conflict.	
- Cultural relevance:  
 People can relate better to the overall process. 
- Community involvement:
 Formal mechanisms can be too selective. 
- Cost effectiveness: 
 For instance, Alie compared the tremendous 
 difference in cost between the ICTR and the 
 Gacaca courts. 
Despite the advantages of local mechanisms, Alie notes that tradition-based mechanisms may not take human 
rights issues on board. Overall, they cannot replace formal systems entirely because of the nature of the 
crimes	committed	in	conflict.	Traditional	justice	mechanisms	are	not	designed	to	address	war	crimes,	crimes	
against humanity and genocide. However, especially with regards to community reconciliation, tradition-
based mechanisms are gaining important momentum, and their use alongside formal mechanisms should be 
supported. 
Jon Lunn
Lunn described the mission and on-going work of Fambul Tok (meaning ‘family ‘talk’ in Krio), an NGO that 
facilitates community-led reconciliation processes within Sierra Leone. 
There is a consensus in both the scholarly 
and practitioner communities that formal TJ 
mechanisms, in particular the SCSL and the 
TRC, had only a limited outreach to rural and 
more remote communities. The creation of 
Fambul Tok in 2008 was in response to these 
limits. Its objective is to engage with populations 
at the grassroots level, in particular people who 
had little to no contact with the SCSL or the 
TRC. The organisation’s principle is to draw 
on the resources of Sierra Leoneans to foster 
peace and reconciliation. Today, Fambul Tok 
operates	in	five	districts	in	Sierra	Leone.		
When working within these districts, Lunn 
stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 first	 establishing	
trust with the communities before they explore 
with	community	leaders	and	members	whether	there	are	unaddressed	traumas	caused	by	the	conflict.	Over	a	
period of 3-6 months, Fambul Tok continues its conversations with community members, and if they are open 
to	the	idea	of	initiating	reconciliation	activities,	they	start	preparations	for	a	‘bonfire	ceremony’.	Communities	
can encompass 5 - 20 villages, all of which will ultimately participate in the ceremony.  
At the heart of these ceremonies is a process of testifying by victim and perpetrators, but they are also a 
‘giant party’, including singing and dancing, prompted by the release of energy that testifying can bring. Lunn 
stressed that the ceremonies are not ‘magic bullets’, but emphasised their many positives, including making it 
possible for voices to be heard that might otherwise not be heard due to power structures within communities. 
Even Chiefs are not immune from accusations and are required to respond constructively. 
Fambul	Tok	Bonfire	Ceremony
Photograph | © Sara Terry for Catalyst for Peace
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Fambul Tok has observed that once the ceremonies are over, the sense of community improves. There is 
closer collaboration among community members and sometimes they engage in common economic activities, 
or	provide	degrees	of	social	protection	and	social	assistance.	‘Peace	mother	groups’	in	all	five	districts	have	
also emerged. Although not originally planned, this turned out to be a very successful outcome of their work 
– a key difference to formal TJ mechanisms in which the outcomes are too often designed before the work 
even commences. 
Today,	Fambul	Tok	has	around	2,000	volunteers	in	all	five	districts,	plus	district	reconciliation	commissions	
and district outreach committees. The latter play an important role as they monitor the reconciliation process, 
follow up with the communities, and ensure sustainability. 
Over	the	four	years	of	its	life,	the	costs	of	the	organisation	were	US	$2.5m.	This	included	150	bonfire	and	
reconciliation ceremonies, involving around 1,500-2000 villages, targeting an audience of 60,000 people. 
In closing, Lunn noted that while organisation had dealt successfully with one high-level perpetrator, the 
ceremonies were not designed with this in mind, thus making clear that Fambul Tok could not be a post-
conflict	solution	alone	–	it	needs	to	work	in	concert	with	other	TJ	mechanisms.
Tim Allen
Allen discussed the growing interest in traditional justice mechanisms over the past years from an anthropological 
point of view. Overall, the shift towards traditional justice has taken those involved in TJ somewhat by surprise, 
and the engagement with it has at times been counterproductive. There is a rising awareness outside of the 
justice	arena	that	our	understanding	of	situations	of	political	turmoil	and	armed	conflict	tends	to	be	very	weak.	
This was highlighted in a recent World Bank report, which noted the almost complete lack of evidence-based 
data	sets	for	evaluating	post-conflict	policies.	To	some	extent,	this	lack	of	knowledge	over	how	best	to	assist	
post-conflict	states	has	led	to	the	increased	interest	in	traditional	justice.
 
Within the scope of the LSE Justice and Security Research Programme (JSRP), Allen has been working 
together with Anne MacDonald on an extensive literature review of current TJ and traditional justice debates. 
He	highlighted	some	of	their	main	findings	as	follows:	
1) It is still unclear what TJ ought to achieve and whether or not it really engages at the local levels. 
This is in particular illustrated in the wording of the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, which leaves room 
for traditional justice as well. In practice, TJ has had multifaceted outcomes and impacts. In Latin America it 
emerged in a transition from oppressive dictatorial regimes to democratic governments. However, today in 
Central Africa we often encounter governments that are becoming more dictatorial and autocratic while linking 
themselves with TJ mechanisms. 
Dancers from the village of Kongonanie in Sierra Leone 
Photograph | © Sara Terry for Catalyst for Peace
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2) There is a tendency to argue that traditional justice is better than TJ mechanisms such as courts or 
TRCs, because it is closer to the people. For Allen this is still an open question. He referred to a recent World 
Bank study on the Central African Republic (CAR), which found that half of the people currently imprisoned 
have been found guilty of witchcraft. Hence, it is important to approach local traditional justice with great care 
as we may not want to encourage, for instance, the punishment of witchcraft in societies where this is still an 
offence. 
3) Traditional justice covers a variety of different notions of accountability. In the African context, 
accountability	fits	under	both	the	justice	umbrella	and	the	health	umbrella.	Especially	in	African	societies	a	
conception of suffering is often linked to interpersonal relations and ideas about the spirit world. Thus, justice 
and healing (or local health and local accountability) are blended together and there is no distinction. It can 
be problematic to try to dissociate accountability from health/ healing and to attempt to professionalise these 
traditional forms from outside. 
4) As soon as external actors become involved in traditional mechanisms of justice, they are not 
traditional mechanisms anymore, but rather hybrid forms of justice. This is not necessarily bad, but calling 
them traditional is no longer valid. For Allen, it is essential to investigate who is controlling the agenda in the 
hybrid space – and noting whether hierarchies of power (for instance around gender) are being replicated.
5) There is a lack of research and evidence about the effectiveness and impact of traditional justice. This 
leads to the further problem that traditional forms of justice are often taken by external actors and implemented 
out	of	context,	leading	to	either	a	lack	of	real	benefit	to	local	communities	or	even	to	harm.	
Allen is not suggesting that local mechanisms of healing and accountability are unimportant.  They can, in 
some circumstances, help communities to move on. However, the idea that these can be taken ‘off the shelf’ 
as	an	alternative	to	conventional	justice	is	a	deeply	flawed.	If	traditional	justice	mechanisms	are	not	studied,	
understood and implemented with great caution and care, the process may be doomed to institutionalise 
power-ridden and counter-productive forms of justice. 
Nathalie Wlodarczyk
Wlodarczyk forecasts the potential for political instability in developing 
countries and for some years has lived between Freetown and London. 
Her doctoral research was on Sierra Leone. It is from this perspective 
that she made observations about TJ and more generally the transition 
process in Sierra Leone.  
Wlodarczyk recalled recent conversations she had had with Sierra 
Leoneans	 and	 noted	 how	 their	 focus	 has	 shifted	 firmly	 towards	
development	and	away	from	dwelling	on	past	conflict.	Hence,	in	her	view,	
TJ mechanisms are increasingly irrelevant to people’s lives. This is not to 
say that Sierra Leoneans are unconcerned about justice, but the justice 
they seek, for the most part, is for contemporary grievances or disputes 
with local authorities, rather than for wrongs connected to the civil war. 
In unsolicited conversations with Sierra Leoneans about the war, 
interlocutors were mainly concerned about the younger generation, as 
younger people do not remember the war. The concern was connected 
in particular to the rallies that took place prior to the 2012 elections, given 
that some of these rallies turned violent. The young did not experience 
what	the	older	generations	went	through	during	the	conflict,	and	are	not	
taught about the war as part of the school curriculum, which is seen as a pressing problem if future violence 
is to be avoided. 
Fisherman in Kroo Bay
Photograph | Simone Datzberger
34
However,	Wlodarczyk	noted	as	much	more	significant	the	observation	that	these	unsolicited	conversations	were	
few and far between – the war almost never comes up in everyday conversation anymore. Sierra Leoneans 
worry more now about issues such as infrastructure development, electricity supply outside Freetown, better 
education and schools or employment generation than TJ or the legacy of the SCSL and other mechanisms. 
Wlodarczyk cautioned that the focus on TJ has become counter-productive and may be best avoided because 
by	looking	backwards	at	the	atrocities	of	the	conflict	the	focus	on	TJ	diverts	attention	from	bigger	challenges,	
namely alleviating the grievances in society that caused the war and addressing new ones.  Sierra Leone has 
moved on, so the focus of scholars and practitioners should be on addressing the issues that are currently 
on the forefront of people’s minds. Sierra Leoneans want an economy and a state that function along with a 
government	that	can	provide	services	and	opportunities	for	its	citizens	regardless	of	their	roles	in	a	conflict	that	
ended a decade ago. The focus of both internal and external actors should be on providing these, as the lack 
of	a	strong	economy	and	functioning	state	contributed	to	causing	past	conflict,	and	could	(though	shows	few	
signs	of	doing	so	at	the	moment)	lead	to	more	conflict	in	future.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Many comments were made in agreement with Wlodarczyk’s observation that structural problems, such as 
exclusion and marginalisation of youth or patrimonialism, which led to the war in Sierra Leone, still persist. 
Present	traumas	within	Sierra	Leonean	society	are	not	so	much	about	the	past	conflict	but	the	daily	challenges	
people face in order to sustain their lives. Strikingly, a lot of these issues, particularly those relating to the role 
of	international	financial	institutions	in	fermenting	economic	decline	and	marginalisation	of	vulnerable	groups,	
were	mentioned	in	the	draft	recommendations	of	the	TRC	report,	only	to	be	deleted	before	the	final	version	
was published. 
Moreover, there was a consensus that Sierra Leone needs a robust regulatory framework with regard to 
the economic sector but also stronger local legal structures and capacities. The GoSL is hesitant to tighten 
regulations, as they fear discouraging potential investors. Studies have shown, however, that often the opposite 
is the case — the better the regulation the safer investors feel in their businesses. 
Women in Kailahun District
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Other comments focused on the question of whether organisations such as Fambul Tok are still relevant 
10	years	after	 the	war,	and	 the	extent	 to	which	 issues	addressed	 in	bonfire	ceremonies	 include	everyday	
challenges versus war-related grievances. On a similar note, the trend to romanticise traditional justice 
practices and mechanisms was an issue of concern to many. The pressure on NGOs to avoid campaigning 
on human rights issues in order not to be perceived as ‘anti-development’ was also discussed. Finally, the 
precursors to development were discussed with an appeal made to broaden out our understanding of what 
post-conflict	societies	need	to	encompass	education,	health	and	improved	life	chances	more	broadly.
UNADDRESSED QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
-  Who controls the agendas in traditional and transitional justice mechanisms? 
-  To what extent should TJ be concerned with issues of social justice? 
-  What role, if any, should TJ mechanisms have played in improving     
 accessibility to the domestic justice system for Sierra Leoneans?
-  How should TJ mechanisms better address and respond the experiences 
 and needs of war affected girls and women? 
-  Was TJ in Sierra Leone gender sensitive?
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CONCLUSION
Rebekka Friedman and Chris Mahony
Legacies	of	violence	persist	long	after	ceasefires	are	signed	and	international	monitors	leave.	The	
social	scars	of	war	remain	after	its	physical	remnants	fade.		For	many	outside	observers,	the	first	
association with Sierra Leone, a small country of just under 6 million people, is blood diamonds 
and amputations. Since the end of the war, the country has again come to international attention 
for its multiple efforts to address the war and move beyond a violent past. While transitional 
justice	has	become	an	 increasingly	globalised	and	prescriptive	field,	how	a	country	 comes	 to	
terms with violence and moves forward is far from clear. The December 11th, 2012 conference 
on Transitional Justice marked the ten-year anniversary of the civil war’s conclusion, democratic 
elections,	and	the	culmination	of	the	high	profile	Charles	Taylor	trial	in	the	Hague.	The	conference	
presented a unique opportunity to take stock of the impact of transitional justice, raising several 
key themes. 
A	first	theme,	representing	the	starting	question	of	the	
conference, is the transformative impact of transitional 
justice. Transitional justice is in many ways a disjointed 
field	 with	 deep	 disagreement	 over	 both	 appropriate	
mechanisms and key objectives. For some observers, 
transitional	justice	is	not	a	field	at	all	but	a	set	of	practices	
and mechanisms, lumped together without adequately 
acknowledging the political bargains and compromises 
they often entail.1  Transitional justice mechanisms are 
teleological in orientation, tied to certain political and 
normative ends. They are meant to have a political, 
social and economic impact in the context of a political 
transition beyond their temporal existence.
How to assess the impact of transitional justice came 
up throughout the conference, suggesting different 
possibilities. One is that transitional justice mechanisms 
have a direct impact on clearly observable outcomes. 
SCSL Prosecutor, Brenda J. Hollis, stressed that 
the SCSL should be evaluated foremost by its ability 
to bring about criminal accountability, to execute its 
mandate to bring to justice those that bear the ‘greatest 
responsibility’ for crimes committed during Sierra 
Leone’s	 civil	 conflict.	 Going	 back	 to	 the	 SCSL’s	 original	 legal	 mandate	 and	 the	 spirit	 within	
which	it	was	founded	was	the	focus	of	the	first	president	of	the	SCSL,	Geoffrey	Robertson,	as	
well.	Robertson	cited	the	financial	constraints	that	informed	the	design	of	the	Court’s	mandate,	
constraining the number of cases it could pursue and the level of independence it enjoyed, as 
acceptable, given the alternative – the absence of criminal accountability.
For	other	speakers,	 transitional	 justice	mechanisms	have	had	an	 insufficient	direct	 impact.	TJ	
mechanisms	have	clear	goals	yet	these	are	insufficiently	implemented;	they	did	not	go	far	enough.	
Joe	A.D.	Alie	highlighted	 the	 lack	of	 follow	up	 to	 the	TRC	and	 the	 insufficient	 implementation	
of the TRC’s recommendations. While Alie rightly emphasised non-implementation, he also 
criticised the lack of comprehensiveness of the recommendations, which did not address issues 
of	macroeconomic	governance	and	engagement	by	international	financial	institutions.
A second possibility is that transitional justice mechanisms have indirect consequences above 
1 Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,” International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009), 7.
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and beyond their original mandates. In her keynote speech, Prosecutor Hollis stressed institution-building as 
one of the primary consequences of the SCSL, citing the design of a witness protection program for Sierra 
Leone’s domestic criminal justice system as well as the transfer of investigative, prosecution and judicial 
expertise via training and the return of Court personnel to domestic service. 
Others also noted the indirect legacies of transitional justice processes. For Friedman, the TRC was a catalyst 
for civil society and provided a platform for mobilisation both for those broadly in favour of the TRC who saw 
themselves as continuing its aims as well as more critically oriented sectors who petitioned and challenged 
aspects of its work. She argued that the net result of a truth-seeking process was its discursive impact on the 
types of claims generated for justice and restitution. 
The indirect and unforeseen consequences of transitional justice also raised some of the broader questions 
of the conference. Scholars of transitional justice have distinguished between the legacy and the impact of 
transitional justice processes. In his research on truth commissions, Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, for example, 
suggests that after controlling for other factors, truth commissions have no quantitative effect on democracy 
or human rights, but notes some qualitative and limited positive effects for institutional reforms.2  Legacy is a 
complex and often abstract concept as Viviane Dittrich’s presentation stressed. Dittrich focused on the Special 
Court’s legacy arguing that there is a multiplicity of legacies continuously reconstructed. 
Legacy includes both visible material and physical consequences and a less visible discursive and normative 
impact, the latter being considerably harder to assess. How do people talk and think about the past? To what 
extent do short-term symbolic trials or hearings have an impact on the national consciousness? It is worth 
noting	 that	 the	TRC	 is	often	criticised	 for	 its	 failure	 to	sufficiently	engage	remote	populations.	That	 lack	of	
engagement	caused	a	 lack	of	popular	awareness	of	 the	TRC’s	findings	and	recommendations.	 Indeed,	as	
noted	by	Jon	Lunn	in	his	presentation,	the	TRC’s	insufficient	presence	in	areas	that	bore	the	brunt	of	the	war,	
motivated the work of Fambul Tok and other on-going reconciliation efforts.
Collective	memory,	however,	 is	 far	 from	unified,	often	demonstrating	more	disagreement	 than	agreement.	
Present-day discussions of the war and its aftermath coalesce on a series of paradigmatic moments. Repeatedly 
at the conference, the audience - particularly Sierra Leonean participants - raised the controversial trial of 
Kamajor leader, Samuel Hinga Norman, who died while in prison. For Lansana Gberie, Norman’s trial remains 
one	of	 the	great	 injustices	of	 the	court,	 threatening	to	stifle	democracy	by	suppressing	popular	resistance.	
Some	of	the	international	officials	involved	with	the	court	also	conceded	a	level	of	nobility	in	the	ostensible	
goals of Norman’s struggle - to reinstate the democratically elected government. They also note, however that 
it is the method of warfare that was criminal, not the purported objective, and that the CDF are alleged to have 
engaged in a joint criminal enterprise closely oriented towards assertion of control over the Tongo Diamond 
Fields.
On the other hand, the conference also brought to the fore the lack of agreement and consensus over the 
ends of transitional justice. Despite the growing interest in transitional justice in academia and practice, we still 
lack a good way to theorise the function and impact of transitional justice mechanisms. Transitional justice is 
a	field	uniquely	represented	by	practitioners.	Self-reflective	and	atomised,	studies	of	transitional	justice	have	
increasingly	evolved	into	a	field	of	their	own.	We	are	therefore	left	with	a	divide	not	just	between	practitioners	
and scholars, but also between transitional justice and peace studies. In consequence, we know little about 
the	empirical	impact	of	transitional	justice	mechanisms,	leaving	their	contribution	to	conflict	prevention	largely	
untested. 
Here, as well, differences emerged among conference participants. It is often charged that international 
actors favour short-term transitional solutions over long-term peace-building and social reconstruction. The 
allegation repeatedly arose that the legal bias of many internationals prioritised an individualised form of 
punitive retributive justice over long-term transformation and restoration. For Phil Clark, international law is 
increasingly detached from local expectations and has had a limited impact on primary stakeholders. As 
discussed by Kirsten Ainley in the Introduction to this report, the TRC and the SCSL represent two distinct 
understandings	of	the	causes	of	conflict:	one	which	stresses	long-term	historical	antecedents	and	structural	
2 Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on Human Rights and Democracy (New 
York: Routledge, 2010)
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root causes, and the other which stresses the responsibility of individuals. Nathalie Wlodarczyk noted that 
many Sierra Leoneans are ready to move past discussions of what caused the war to focus on how to bring 
about future economic growth and improved governance.
These questions go beyond academic debates. In a country with a long history of international intervention and 
exploitation, transitional justice becomes politicised in Sierra Leone, where transitional justice institutions tie 
into a politics of cultural relativism and legitimacy. Tim Allen spoke to the legitimacy of these various processes, 
given the absence of evidence-based data sets demonstrating impact. Allen pointed to the legitimising effect 
of TJ for sitting governments as being of greatest utility. For some, legitimacy and authenticity seem to be 
the foremost criteria with which to determine the success or at least appropriateness of transitional justice. 
Local actors and approaches contrast themselves as more representative and authentic than formalised and 
internationally-influenced	international	courts	and	truth	commissions,	and	claim	greater	legitimacy	because	of	
this. 
Various participants and speakers, including Allen, warned against the “romanticisation” of transitional justice 
and the distinction between an organic or grassroots approach and an authentic approach. This distinction 
is especially important in a multi-ethnic country where large-scale displacement impeded transmission of 
traditions to the next generation.  It is also prescient in a context where the RUF systematically targeted 
elders	and	authority	figures,	i.e.	those	who	were	in	the	past	responsible	for	passing	down	traditions	and	for	
making	and	adjudicating	law.	The	fear	was	also	raised	that	the	re-institution	of	traditional	authority	figures	and	
practices could reinforce the hierarchical society and patrimonial authority patterns that fed the marginalisation 
of	groups	such	as	women	or	rural	communities	–	a	key	driver	of	conflict.	
The conference also addressed a related theme: the 
complementarity of mechanisms of transitional justice. While 
William	Schabas	has	identified	Sierra	Leone	as	a	success	story	for	
the two-track approach, the speakers at the conference discussed 
tensions between different mechanisms.3  The TRC and SCSL had 
a particularly strained relationship, reaching its apex in a series of 
highly politicised moments, such as Norman’s request to speak 
at the TRC. The relationship also included unresolved questions 
of jurisdictional demarcation, for instance regarding the use of 
information	and	confidentiality.	
Another question is what constitutes a formal rather than an 
informal mechanism. Fambul Tok, for example, sometimes 
characterised as an alternative to the TRC – and indeed set up 
partly in criticism of the TRC’s procedures and impact - can also 
be seen as a consequence of the TRC and a follow up of its aims. 
Moreover, and extending to the comparison of transitional justice in 
Sierra Leone to other contexts, while TRCs are frequently grouped 
together as formal mechanisms alongside trials, they are also a 
remarkably	 fluid	 form	 of	 transitional	 justice,	 able	 to	 invent	 and	
reinvent themselves within contexts. TRCs also more purposely  
         seek out and work through popular engagement.
A third theme is locating the subjects and indeed audience of transitional justice. If transitional justice is to 
be victim-centred, of paramount concern are those on the margins: youth and women in particular. The TRC 
identified	girls	and	women	as	the	primary	victims	of	 the	war,	and	rape	and	sexual	slavery	as	 targeted	and	
regularly deployed crimes. The TRC has been said to have brought important focus to issues relating to 
women and youth. One element of the Court’s function emphasised by Prosecutor Hollis is the extent to which 
3 William Schabas, “The Relationship between Truth Commissions and International Courts: the Case of Sierra Leone,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2003).
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the Court advanced jurisprudence on sex crimes and crimes against children, citing the prosecution 
of forced marriage and conscription of child soldiers. At the same time, discussion of sexual violence 
remains heavily stigmatised in the country.
 
One could argue that transitional justice should play an educational role, targeting the next generation. 
However, Chandra Sriram emphasised in her talk the far from satisfactory transitional justice impact 
on	the	conflict’s	primary	stakeholders	(victims	and	ex-combatants	who	bore	the	brunt	of	the	conflict).	
Victims, as Friedman also stressed, often live in the shadows, literally isolated from society in disability 
camps or ostracised in their own communities. 
A key driver of the disconnect between Sierra 
Leone’s processes and their key stakeholders 
is politics. Chris Mahony discussed the 
historical context in which these institutions 
functioned, citing changing security dynamics 
in Sierra Leone and a partisan change in US 
policy as producing two separate conclusions 
to	 the	 conflict,	 accompanied	by	 two	different	
transitional justice processes. These two 
processes both prioritised, or at lease 
disproportionately accommodated, political 
considerations at the expense of the interests 
of victims. At the TRC this could be observed 
in the absence of rigorous examination of key 
witnesses, and at the Special Court the politics 
was evident in the victor-oriented selection of 
cases for prosecution. While these processes 
may not have brought justice, in the purest 
sense, they did assist a transition to stability. The longevity of that stability may be considered ten years 
from now, when we reconvene to consider the lasting impact of transitional justice in Sierra Leone.
As the SCSL closes and Sierra Leone enters a new chapter under the newly elected government, 
the questions raised at the conference will become especially relevant both within Sierra Leone and 
also as a learning opportunity for other countries recovering from violence. For some observers at the 
conference, it is simply too soon to evaluate the impact of transitional justice. To the extent that the 
country has been a success story in its recovery from violence, much will hang on the next generation 
as the collective war weariness and shock of eleven years of violence fades away.  Ultimately, however, 
for transitional justice to be relevant it must plug into the everyday lives of Sierra Leonean women and 
men and be seen as broadly legitimate and representative of widely shared goals and values.
ICON Brothers – Youth Club in Freetown.
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CONFERENCE PROGRAMME
Ten Years On: Sierra Leone’s Post-Conflict 
Transition
Tuesday, 11 December 2012
London House, Goodenough College, London WC1N 2AB   
Sierra Leone’s civil conflict caused 70,000 casualties and left 2.6 million people 
displaced. The war was known for widespread atrocities, including forced recruitment 
of child soldiers, rape and sexual slavery, and amputations of limbs. Ten years since 
the end of its eleven-year civil war, Sierra Leone is again in the international news. 
The recent sentencing of Charles Taylor in The Hague marks the first international trial 
of an African Head of State. Meanwhile, within Sierra Leone, democratic elections on 
November 17, 2012 mark a critical evaluation point for the country’s transition to peace.
This symposium takes stock of Sierra Leone’s post-conflict transition. Termed by William 
Schabas as a successful example of the ‘two-track’ approach, Sierra Leone has been 
a site of multiple international and domestic mechanisms of transitional justice. The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and 
on-going community reconciliation processes have all sought to address the legacies 
of violence and put the country on a more secure footing. The symposium invites 
scholars, in the context of recent elections, to examine the impact of transitional justice 
in Sierra Leone. Do transitional justice approaches present short-term solutions or do 
they work towards long-term peace, stability, and development? Do transitional justice 
mechanisms address the visible legacies of conflict (victims, justice for atrocities, 
and in this case, child soldiers), or conflict’s long-term drivers (economic, social and 
political)? To what extent have transitional justice approaches complemented each 
other, as some have claimed, or are they in tension? Ten years on, to what extent has 
transitional justice been transformative within Sierra Leone?
Conference Organised by: 
Kirsten Ainley (LSE); Rebekka Friedman (LSE); Chris Mahony (University of Auckland)
PROGRAMME
10.45 – 11.00 WELCOME | Kirsten Ainley (International Relations, LSE)
11.00 – 12.30 KEYNOTE SPEECH by the Prosecutor of the SCSL, Brenda J.   
   Hollis
   
   CHAIR | Rebekka Friedman (International Relations, LSE)
13.15 – 14.30 PANEL 1
C
O
N
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E
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   CHAIR | Chris Alden (International Relations, LSE)
   
   Geoffrey Robertson (Doughty Street Chambers, London)
   
   The Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
   Chris Mahony (New Zealand Centre for Human Rights Law, Policy  
   and Practice, University of Auckland)
   
   The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Political Justice?
   Joe A.D. Alie (History, Fourah Bay College, Freetown)
   
   The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Peace Building in  
   Sierra  Leone
   Phil Clark (Politics & International Studies, School of Oriental and  
   African Studies, London)
   
   The Obsolescence of International Law? Comparative    
   Perspectives on International Criminal Justice from the African  
   Great Lakes
14.30 – 15.45     PANEL 2
   CHAIR | Chris Mahony (Human Rights, Policy & Practice,   
   University of Auckland)
   
   Lansana Gberie (Security Council Report, New York)
   
   The Trial of the CDF: A Perverse Legacy of the Special Court for  
   Sierra Leone
   
   Kieran Mitton  (International Relations, King’s College, London)
   
   Integration or Infiltration? Ex-combatants and Politics in Post- 
   conflict Sierra Leone
   
   Chandra Sriram (Law, School of Oriental and African Studies,  
    London)
   
   Victims and Ex-combatants in Sierra Leone
   
   Viviane Dittrich (International Relations, LSE)
   
   Towards Completion and Beyond: Legacies of the Special Court  
    for Sierra Leone
15.45 – 16.15     Coffee
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16.15 – 17.45     ROUNDTABLE
   CHAIR | Kirsten Ainley (International Relations, LSE)
   
   Joe A.D. Alie (History, Fourah Bay College, Freetown)
   
   Tim Allen (International Development, LSE)
   
   Rebekka Friedman (International Relations, LSE)
   
   Jon Lunn (Fambul Tok Advisory Group, London)
   
   Nathalie Wlodarczyk (Exclusive Analysis, London)
Artists for Peace
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LIST OF SPEAKERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
Kirsten Ainley  is a Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science. Her research focuses on the history and 
development of international criminal law, international political theory, human rights and 
humanitarian intervention. She has published on international criminal law, transitional justice, 
the International Criminal Court, individual and collective responsibility for atrocity and the 
notion of evil in international relations. She is the co-author of Understanding International 
Relations (Palgrave) with Chris Brown. K.a.ainley@lse.ac.uk 
Joe A.D. Alie holds	 a	 PhD	 and	 Certificate	 in	 African	 Studies	 from	 the	 University	 of	
Wisconsin-Madison, USA and an MA and BA Honours in History from the University of Sierra 
Leone. He is an Associate Professor, Dean of the School of Postgraduate Studies and Head, 
Department of History and African Studies at Fourah Bay College (University of Sierra Leone), 
where he has lectured for the past 27 years.  Dr Alie has published many scholarly works, the 
most recent being Sierra Leone Since Independence: History of a Postcolonial State.  
joealie49@yahoo.co.uk 
Tim Allen is Professor in Development Anthropology and head of the department of 
International Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is 
also research director of the Justice and Security Research Programme, based at the LSE 
with funding from the UK’s Department for International Development. He has spent more than 
thirty years working and researching in various parts of Africa, as well as writing on international 
issues. Some of his books include Poverty and Development into the 21st Century (OUP), The 
Media	of	Conflict:	War	Reporting	and	Representations	of	Ethnic	Violence (Zed Books), Divided 
Europeans:	Understanding	Ethnicities	in	Conflict	(Kluwer), and In Search of Cool Ground: War, 
Flight and Homecoming in Northeast Africa (James Currey). He has also published on the 
LRA: The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (Zed Books), and Trial Justice: the Lord’s 
Resistance Army and the International Criminal Court (Zed Press). T.Allen@lse.ac.uk 
Phil Clark is a lecturer in comparative and international politics at SOAS, University of 
London, and co-founder of Oxford Transitional Justice Research, University of Oxford. He 
specialises	in	conflict	issues	in	central	Africa,	particularly	causes	and	responses	to	genocide	
and other mass crimes. His latest book is The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and 
Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers (Cambridge University Press). He is 
currently completing a book on the work of the ICC in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. pc44@soas.ac.uk 
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Simone Datzberger is a doctoral candidate in International Relations and graduate 
teaching assistant at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). From 
2007-2010	 she	worked	 for	 the	United	Nations	Peacebuilding	Support	Office	 (UNPBSO)	 in	
New York. She obtained a MA degree in political science from the University of Vienna, and 
spent	one	year	at	 the	Free	University	of	Brussels.	She	conducted	extensive	field	 research	
on the role and involvement of civil society in Mexico (2005-06) and in Sierra Leone (2011, 
2012). Her research interests include: Civil Society, Peacebuilding, and Development Studies. 
S.Datzberger@lse.ac.uk 
Viviane Dittrich  is currently a postgraduate researcher in the Department of 
International  Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). 
Her research focuses on international institutions, namely international criminal tribunals, 
post-conflict	justice	and	peace.	Her	recent	fieldwork	covers	the	Special	Court	for	Sierra	
Leone in light of its imminent closure and legacies. After her studies at Sciences Po 
(France), Wellesley College (USA) and the LSE, she received a Double Masters Degree in 
International Relations. V.Dittrich@lse.ac.uk
Rebekka Friedman just completed her PhD in the International Relations Department 
at the London School of Economics. Her research focuses on transitional justice, Truth and 
Reconciliation	Commissions,	restorative	justice,	and	post-conflict	reconciliation.	Her	PhD	thesis	
examines	the	impact	of	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commissions	on	post-conflict	reconciliation	in	
Sierra Leone and Peru. She was co-editor of Millennium: Journal of International Studies, and 
just completed an edited book project on liberalism in International Relations, and is currently 
teaching at the University of Oxford Foreign Service Programme. R.c.friedman@lse.ac.uk
Lansana Gberie is Research Analyst for Security Council Report in New York. An 
academic and writer, Dr. Gberie is the author of A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the 
Destruction of Sierra Leone (London: Hurst 2005). Dr. Gberie was awarded the ‘Outstanding 
Research Award’ by the Canadian government body IDRC in 2002 for his work with Partnership 
Africa Canada on the Human Security and International Diamond Trade project; he and his 
colleagues were also nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by three senior US lawmakers for 
this work the following year. Dr. Gberie is writing a book on War, Memory and Justice in West 
Africa for Hurst.  lagberie@yahoo.com
Brenda J. Hollis is the Prosecutor of the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone. Since 
February 2007, she has led the prosecution of the former Liberian President Charles Taylor, 
who is currently appealing a conviction and 50-year custodial sentence for war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
Sierra	Leone	during	the	country’s	armed	conflict.	Prior	to	her	work	with	the	Special	Court,	Hollis	
worked	with	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor	at	the	International	Court	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia	
where she served in various capacities, including as lead counsel. She has consulted on many 
matters related to international law, including assisting victims’ groups from Columbia and the 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo, and providing expertise and training for international courts 
and tribunals in Indonesia, Iraq and Cambodia.  In 1998, she retired from the United States Air 
Force with the rank of Colonel.
Chandra Lekha Sriram is Professor of Law at the University of London, SOAS, and is 
author and editor of various books and journal articles on international relations, international 
law,	human	rights	and	conflict	prevention	and	peacebuilding,	including:		Peace as governance: 
power-sharing, armed groups, and contemporary peace negotiations; Globalizing justice for 
mass atrocities: A revolution in accountability; and Confronting past human rights violations: 
Justice versus peace in times of transition. She is Principal Investigator on a grant from the 
ESRC on the Impact of Transitional Justice Measures on Democratic Institution-building, in 
collaboration with Anja Mihr of the University of Utrecht (funded by NWO). Cs79@soas.ac.uk
Jon Lunn. Over the past 20 years or so, Jon Lunn has worked in academia, government and 
for human rights NGOs. He has been involved with transitional justice issues in Sierra Leone 
since 1998 and is currently acting convenor of Fambul Tok’s advisory group. He currently 
works for the House of Commons Research Service. J.lunn@fambultok.org
Chris Mahony is Deputy Director of the New Zealand Centre for Human Rights Law, Policy 
and Practice, Faculty of Law, University of Auckland. He is a candidate for a DPhil in Politics 
at the University of Oxford. He drafted the recommendations on governance for the Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and co-authored the ‘Historical antecedents 
to	 the	 conflict’	 chapter.	 In	 2008,	 he	 directed	 the	Witness	Evaluation	 Legacy	Project	 at	 the	
Special Court for Sierra Leone. He has advised the British and US governments, the Institute 
for Security Studies, the Open Society Initiative and the International Centre for Transitional 
Justice on justice sector reform and transitional justice issues. c.mahony@auckland.ac.nz 
Geoffrey Robertson QC has been counsel in many landmark cases in constitutional, 
criminal and media law in the Courts of Britain and the Commonwealth and he makes frequent 
appearances in the Privy Council and the European Court of Human Rights. He has maintained 
a wide advisory practice and has served part-time as a UN appeal judge at the Special Court 
for	Sierra	Leone,	as	well	as	serving	as	the	Court’s	first	President.	In	2008	the	UN	Secretary	
General appointed him as one of the three distinguished jurist members of the UN’s Internal 
Justice Council. Mr Robertson is the author of Crimes against Humanity – The Struggle for 
Global Justice (Penguin) and The Tyrannicide Brief (Chatto & Windus), the story of how 
Cromwell’s	lawyers	produced	the	first	trial	of	a	Head	of	State	–	that	of	Charles	I.	Mr	Robertson	
is founder and head of Doughty Street Chambers, the UK’s leading human rights practice. He 
is a Bencher of the Middle Temple; and a Recorder (part-time judge) in London; an executive 
Member of Justice, and a trustee of the Capital Cases Trust. He is visiting Professor in Human 
Rights at Queen Mary College, University of London.
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Nathalie Wlodarczyk is a Forecasting Director at Exclusive Analysis, a London-based 
strategic intelligence company that forecasts political risk. She is responsible for maintaining 
and developing methodology for accurately assessing the outlook for political instability and 
associated violent and regulatory risks for public and private sector clients. Her background 
is	 in	African	 influence	politics	and	 the	 role	of	belief	 in	warfare.	She	 is	 the	author	of	Magic 
and	Warfare:	Appearance	and	Reality	 in	Contemporary	African	Conflict	and	Beyond, which 
focuses on Sierra Leone and currently splits her time between London and Freetown. 
nathalie.wlodarczyk@ihs.com 
Sierra Leone’s striking natural beauty is a side of the country that remains largely 
unseen by the international community. 
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